3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon World

It is sad but true that the Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon 175
world have never developed through the centuries that close and 648
constant relationship which has existed in the case of so many other peoples. There have been moments of contact but these have never lasted and did not until the present time result in a steady stream of interest. — Yet this unfortunate fact has been due rather to the history of the two peoples and to their geographical locations than to any deliberate neglect on either part. The Anglo-Saxon race, taking its rise from England, an island on the northwestern coast of Europe, was chiefly concerned with areas that it could reach by sea. During its long centuries of oppression, Ukraine was completely landlocked. It was cut off from the Black Sea by the Tatars. It was hemmed in on the north and east by Moscow and on the west where it formed part of the Polish-Lithuanian state, there was little encouragement for foreigners to travel to it.

It is interesting, however, that in all of the periods when Ukraine was playing an important rôle in European affairs, knowledge of it reached England, but almost invariably it was by means more or less connected with the sea.

Let us look first at the Kyiv period, when Kyiv was one of the great capitals of Christian Europe and when it far surpassed in wealth and culture any of the western capitals. At this period the bonds between Kyiv-Rus and Scandinavia were close. Even Volodymyr after the death of his father Svyatoslav was obliged to retire to Scandinavia and return with Varangian troops before he could establish himself on the throne. It was the same period when England was being ruled by King Canute the Dane. The Northmen, sailing back and forth across the North Sea, could not fail to carry news of the exploits of their Varangian cousins. A little later one of the daughters of Yaroslav was married to King Harold Hardraga, the King of Norway, who was later to fall in 1066 at the battle of Stamford Bridge only a few days before his conqueror King Harold II, the last Saxon King of England, was destined to fall before William of Normandy at Hastings. Later a daughter of Harold married Volodymyr Mono-

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makh. Thus by the nature of events, during this period when both England and Ukraine were connected with the Scandinavian north, the court of Kyiv became well-known to English and especially Saxon nobles fleeing from their enemies in their own land. It brought about a personal acquaintance which had no deep roots and which ended with the disintegration of Kyiv and the absorption of England into the area of the Norman influence.

Nevertheless there was established at Kyiv a Scotch Benedictine Monastery in the eleventh century which continued until the Mongol invasion. It would be interesting to know whether this was a purely missionary establishment in the hope of introducing the western traditions into Kyiv or whether the monks had fled from the Norman conquest and the border disturbances, since at that time the King of Scotland was connected by marriage with the Saxon royal family and strove in vain to assist them against the new conquerors. At all events their residence in Kyiv was marked by signs of close friendship between them and the clergy and population of Kyiv.

After the Tatar conquest, we find that the Metropolitan Ruthenus Petrus, the Ruthenian Metropolitan Peter, was present at the First Council of Lyons in 1245. He had been installed as Metropolitan of Kyiv about 1242 with the aid of the patriotic groups, especially Prince Mykhajlo of Chernyhiv, who was later martyred by the Tatars. It is interesting that his presence at the Council in an attempt to secure the aid of the West has been recorded only by two English chroniclers of the Council, a fact that suggests some personal friendship which had perhaps been formed at Lyons.

Then came the Middle Ages, the period of the Crusades, and the constant wars of England and France. It was a period, in Ukraine, when there was not much to attract foreigners. The English were finding themselves on the sea and their sailors appeared quite frequently in Baltic ports and in the White Sea, but the latter were in far closer relations with Moscow than with Ukraine, especially as the Muscovites completely ignored the Ukrainian Orthodox at this period.

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As we might expect, it was the exploits of the Cossacks that reawakened interest and this time the English inspiration to learn more of the Ukrainians was largely derived from their relations with Constantinople. It was the sea-raids of the Cossacks that won their attention and the importance of these were stressed by the Patriarch Cyril Loukaris, who was very familiar with the situation in Ukraine. As a young man, the nephew of the then acting Patriarch, he had taught in Wilno. He was a friend of Count Constantin Ostrozhskyj and he was present at the Council at Brest. Ever after he retained his friendship with the leaders of Ukraine, Moldavia, and Vallakhia, and so he remained posted on the progress of the Orthodox in Ukraine and the history of the Cossack movement.

The English ambassador at Constantinople in the early seventeenth century, Thomas Roe, who played an important rôle in the religious conflicts in that city, was a strong supporter and friend of Cyril. He made many reports on the Cossacks and their raids and even attempted to save the life of the Cossack leader Samuil Koretsky, who had been taken prisoner by the Turkish forces, by pleading for him in the name of the King of England. Roe also, as a friend of Prince Gabriel Bethlen of Transylvania, may perhaps have been the author of the plan to unite the Ukrainian Orthodox with the Transylvanian Calvinists and the Swedes for overthrowing Poland during the Thirty Years' War. At the same time Yuryj Nemyrych who was later to succeed in arranging an alliance between Ukraine and Sweden was a student in England.

The revolt of Khmelnytskyj in 1648 was frequently noticed in the English newspapers which compared the Cossacks' leader to Oliver Cromwell. There are constant rumors that there was some correspondence between the two men but this has never been proved, perhaps because of the destruction of many of the documents of the day. It is, however, said that the radical Cossack leader who played an important rôle during part of the period, Maksym Kryvonos, Maxim of the Crooked Nose, was a Scotsman. He appears and disappears mysteriously in the course of the Cossack movement. He was far more bitter in his hatred than Khmelnytskyj and it is perhaps conceivable that

175 he was a fanatic Protestant who had come to the Cossacks to
648 stir them up to increased and unreasoning bitterness.

During the years after the Cossack uprising, several Englishmen who were either in Poland or in Russia made lengthy reports on the life of the Cossacks, but the next important event in Ukrainian history, the revolt of Mazeppa, again aroused considerable interest, no less so because Peter the Great in an endeavour to break support for Charles XII of Sweden had apparently at one time thought of making the Duke of Marlborough the master of Ukraine. Nothing of course came of this plan but the English ambassador in Russia, Charles Lord Whitworth, reported on the actions of Mazeppa and the destruction of Baturin by the Muscovite armies.

After the defeat of Charles XII at Poltava, English diplomatic circles joined the Swedes in the effort to stop the advance of Peter the Great against that country. This brought them into contact with Phillip Orlyk, who was elected Hetman after the death of Mazeppa, and who spent years in Sweden and Turkey in an effort to form a coalition against Peter and restore freedom to Ukraine. None of Orlyk's hopes materialised but when he was in Turkey, he had the active support of the British ambassador who put pressure upon the Turks to counterbalance the demands of the Russians that he be surrendered.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the destruction of the political liberties of Ukraine and the general temper of the times tended to accept Ukraine as definitely part of Russia. England's opposition to Russian expansion became more and more felt in Asia and in the Balkans, where Russia was trying to bring under her control the other Orthodox Slavs. It was a period when Western Europe abandoned any hope of securing allies from the oppressed nations of Russia, even though there was a growing interest in the cultures of the different Slav peoples.

Thus by the time of World War I, the British authorities like the Americans were inclined to accept the statements of the Tsarist diplomats that the Ukrainian movement was solely a product of German propaganda and even after the Russian

Revolution, they did not seriously consider the situation which was then presented. At the same time, the French were so interested in the restoration of Poland that they had little inclination to listen to representatives of a people who were in opposition to their friends. 175 648

We thus see that the chief relations between England and Ukraine were to be found in the diplomatic sphere and in the reports of travellers and the works of various professors who were interested in the Slav languages and literatures, while the professors of history in the later periods were inclined to accept the various Russian theories of their own history, which were of course opposed to Ukraine. There was no opportunity for any large-scale personal acquaintance with the Ukrainians or their problems, and in this the Ukrainian situation followed closely the general pattern of British relations with the other countries of Eastern Europe.

Then at the end of the nineteenth century, a new situation arose in the United States and a little later in Canada. There came a relatively large-scale immigration of Ukrainians who settled chiefly in the factory and mining centers of the Eastern United States and the prairie farming regions in Western Canada. Most of these new immigrants came from Western Ukraine which was under the domination of Austria-Hungary as a wave of the great migration of peoples from that area. The difference in their choice of occupations in the United States and Canada was largely due to the difference between the methods adopted by the two countries in dealing with new arrivals. In the United States, they were allowed to find employment as they would and they gravitated to areas where there was already a considerable population of Slavs from Austria-Hungary. In Canada they were encouraged by the government to settle on still unoccupied land in the northwest and were given opportunities for acquiring their own land, as immigrants had been in the United States a half century before. 167

Relatively few of the Ukrainian educated class came to the New World. The vast majority were peasants who hoped in the beginning to acquire the money in a few years to return to their old homes and live there in relative comfort. They were only

669 1917—April 1921). The 'Petlyurians' also occupy first place for the number of organized pogroms—493, or together with the 'free' *atamans*—852; the Volunteers follow with 233; the Soviets with 106; and the Poles with 32. How far Petlyura himself was guilty in the organization of these pogroms it is difficult to say. Arnold Margolin, himself a Jew, relates that Petlyura was extremely depressed by pogroms, and 'with tears in his eyes implored his men not to commit them'. But to persuade these 'last of the *Haydamaky*' to any moderation was no easy task.

[illegible] Petlyura can scarcely be accused of having seriously favoured pogroms as part of a considered policy, since both he and the 'Directoria' were making every effort to attract the favourable attention of the representatives of the victorious Entente powers. Immediately after the Armistice a report had been addressed to Consul Hainnot, which was subsequently forwarded to General d'Anselm in Odessa and to General Berthelot, who was at that time in Jassy. This report was intended to establish the fact that the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' was a quite normal, strictly democratic, and independent state. Although the French did not hesitate to drive away the detachments of the 'Directoria' by force of arms from the vicinity of Odessa, in January 1919 they went so far as to send a representative to Kiev in the person of General Tabouis. The British, at the same time, contented themselves with the despatch to Kiev of a member of the Consular Service. Altogether the impression gained ground in Kiev that the Ukraine had been reserved as a zone of French interest, while the British were more concerned with the Caucasian area and with the Volunteer Army.

The 'Directoria' viewed the question of its representation at the Paris Peace Conference as a matter of particular importance. A Delegation was hastily formed which included the 'Western Ukrainians' of Galicia with the engineer Sidorenko at their head; the 'Directoria' was represented by their 'Foreign Minister', A. Shulgin; and the numerous Jewish population of the Ukraine had a spokesman in Arnold Margolin. This Delegation, together with others of Governments which had been formed or which had tried to form themselves out of different parts of the Russian Empire, had not been invited to Paris by anyone and was recognized by no one. The Secretary of the Ukrainian Delegation, I. Borshak, summarizing the results of the work done between January and March 1919, reported to the 'Directoria': 'All asked us for information about the Ukrainian Question, but none gave any positive answer. No one promised to recognize our independence. The usual answer was: "Wait till the Conference discusses the Russian

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Question!" There was talk on general topics—the territory, the 648
numbers of the population, our relation with the Bolsheviks and 668
General Denikin. Official French circles were against the Ukraine. Other states, the U.S.A., England and Japan, were on their guard and were only interested in the means at our disposal for struggling against the Bolsheviks' (I. Borshak, *Ukraine at the Peace Conference*).

The French were mainly concerned for the interest of Poland and the 'Directoria' undoubtedly made a serious tactical mistake when they involved the fate of Galicia with that of the Russian Ukraine. Furthermore, so soon after the recent hard struggle with Germany, the representatives of the Allies were not inclined to regard with favour envoys from the *de facto* succession states of the Russian Empire the Governments of which had owed their origin to German diplomacy and German bayonets.

Another member of the Ukrainian Delegation, Arnold Margolin, complains of 'the influence of Russians' who, from the monarchist groups to radical leaders like Kerenski, Avksentiev and Chaykovski, were all united in the belief that Russia 'one and indivisible' would be resuscitated. Margolin proposed that all 'the oppressed nationalities of the former Empire—not only Ukrainians, but also Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, the Cossacks of the Don and the Kuban, the Mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus and the White Russians adjoining the Polish provinces—should be invited to the Conference'. But when Margolin obtained an interview with Lansing, the latter told him frankly that 'he knew only one Russia which might perhaps become a federative state after she had got rid of the Bolsheviks'. Margolin betook himself to England, but there he found that people were only interested in the successes of the 'White' Armies of Denikin and Kolchak and believed in their ultimate victory. After having failed to raise interest in the fate of the 'oppressed nationalities' of the Russian Empire, Margolin broached the question of the fate of the Jews, but here too he found that people were not interested. In 1919 it was well remembered that the Jewish population of Poland and the Ukraine had been on the side of the Germans and that German Jews had taken upon themselves the role of intermediaries between the German High Command and the Bolsheviks.

The only practical result of the 'diplomatic relations' between France and the 'Directoria' was a categorical demand on the part of the French that Vinnichenko and another minister, Shakhovsky, should retire—because they were suspected of 'Bolshevism'.

The representatives of the Entente powers appear to have made every effort to unite [redacted] were struggling against

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● 648 the Soviets, but they had no easy task. The Volunteer Army re-
668 garded the 'Petlyurians' with scarcely less distaste than it did the Bolsheviks, while the 'Directoria' considered the 'White' movement to be monarchical and reactionary, and the Ukrainian nationalists aimed at separation rather than at federalism. The relation between the Volunteer Army and the Poles was outwardly correct, but each grudged the other success in their 'common struggle' against the Soviets. The Russians were nervous about the Polish campaign in White Russia and Volhynia; the Poles feared the resurrection of a great Russia. The Poles went so far as to hold their advance against the Red Army when this advance could have dealt a decisive blow to the Soviets at the moment of Denikin's greatest success. These dissensions, which were natural enough, in the end allowed the Bolsheviks to extricate themselves from a position which, as Trotsky relates in his memoirs, Lenin at that time regarded as hopeless.

669 In July the Volunteer Army occupied Ekaterinoslav; then Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa; and on the 3rd Kharkov had been taken after some fighting. Regardless of General Wrangel's proposal to halt on the line Tsaritsyn-Ekaterinoslav and to put some order into the disorganized rear, Denikin pressed the advance in a northerly direction towards Moscow and westward on Kiev. As a result his none too numerous forces were widely scattered over an enormous territory.

669 At the same time Petlyura had begun his advance on Kiev from
648 the west, and this circumstance was one of the reasons for the false
manœuvre undertaken by the Volunteer Army. In the end the
648 Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' came up to Kiev at the same time, and the ancient city was taken on 1 September, from the east by the 'Whites' and from the south by the Ukrainians. No good could be expected to result from this simultaneous but separate occupation of Kiev by the rival armies. *Pourparlers* did not result in an agreement. It only became clear that the Galicians were ready to come to an understanding with the 'Whites', but the 'Directoria' was jealous, and stubborn. Petlyura demanded complete independence and vast territories. In his blind hate of 'the Russian monarchists and reactionaries' he secretly appealed for help to the Poles. When in the second half of September armed conflicts between the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' broke out and the latter were driven out of Kiev towards the west, rumours of Petlyura's negotiations with the Poles set the Galician regiments against him. On 7 November the Galicians, tired of the lack of discipline and inefficiency rife among the 'Petlyurians', decided to desert their leader and to go over to the

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Volunteers in order to continue a joint struggle against the Bolsheviks 669
and, if need be, against the Poles. 648

The remnants of the 'Petlyurians' went off into Podolia, where 642
they renewed their brutal pogroms against the Jews. During the latter part of November and December they were decimated by a serious epidemic of black typhus which overtook them in the neighbourhood of Zhmerinka.

Having lost his army and almost alone, Petlyura betook himself to the Polish lines, where on 2 December he put his hand to a secret agreement, in the name of the 'Directoria'., whereby he abandoned all claims on Galicia and 'recognized' Polish rule over Kholm, Polesia and Western Podolia—regions which were already in occupation of the Polish Army. On 24 December the 'Directoria' ceased to exist and gave over its phantom authority to a 'cabinet' formed by one Isaac Mazeppa, an ex-employee of the Union of Zemstvos.

In the meantime catastrophe had overtaken the Volunteer Army. 669
Having occupied Kiev and Chernigov during September, the 'Whites' had reached Kursk and even Orel by the end of October. Their line was now dangerously extended and the advance succumbed to a sudden flanking attack delivered to the north of Kharkov. A serious defeat at Kromy to the south-west of Orel forced them out of the whole area between Kursk and Kharkov. Their collapse was now even more rapid than their progress had been. Kiev was evacuated, and within a few weeks all the Ukraine, in circumstances which grew more perilous every day.

The Volunteer Army had never been popular among the peasantry. During the preceding three years the peasants had lived through an evil nightmare of change and upheaval. They distrusted 'the officers' army' and suspected it, not without reason, of being the instrument whereby 'the former order' would be restored. In many cases the officials hastily appointed by General Denikin had contributed to this distrust by an ill-considered restoration of the rights of property in districts which they had been sent to administer. Though the peasant had never found any benefit from 'the new order' he was stubbornly opposed to a return to 'the old ways'. This frame of mind was the principal cause of the chaos which reigned in the rear of the White Army and it was more conducive to the catastrophe of the autumn of 1919 than either the unfortunate strategy of General Denikin or the superior abilities of the Red Army chiefs.

'The struggle which in 1919 drenched the Ukraine in blood recalled by its cruelties the Cossack risings of the seventeenth

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113 the Ukraine), Warsaw, 1937; Pierre Brégy and Prince Serge Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, Paris, 1939.

A third group of sources is to be found in the accounts of foreign travellers who have visited the Ukraine during the last two decades. Although few of these would claim to have had a proper opportunity of forming a true impression of the political and social struggle which has been going on in the Ukraine, there are some foreign newspaper correspondents whose knowledge and contacts gave them certain facilities for securing information which no passing tourist (however enthusiastic) could acquire. The most distinguished of these correspondents (up to 1934) was Paul Scheffer of the *Berliner Tageblatt* and Dr Basseches of the *Neue Freie Presse*.

The writer of an article in the *Fortnightly Review* of October 1934 gave an important account of the famine in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava and Kharkov. He confirmed the fact that cases of cannibalism had occurred. One of these cases later became known from Soviet sources, in consequence of a trial which took place in the town of Izyum in the region of Kharkov. A female shopkeeper named Kovaleva was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment for selling human flesh. She confessed that she had also done so during the famine of 1920–21.

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(12) *The Diplomatic Representation abroad of the Ukrainian S.S.R.*

A curious evolution in the views of the Soviet Government concerning the degree of independence to be enjoyed by the Ukrainian S.S.R. can be traced in the history of the diplomatic representation of the Republic abroad. After the first Constitution of the Ukrainian S.S.R. had been legalized in March 1920, a Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was established in Kharkov—which city had been made the capital of the Ukraine. The first Commissar for Foreign Affairs was Kovalev, who within a month was replaced by Rakovski—at that time also President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. In April 1920, Rakovski appointed his first diplomatic representative abroad in the person of M. Levitsky, who was sent to Prague, although the new Czech Republic had not yet recognized either the Soviet Union or the Ukrainian S.S.R. A little later a certain Aussem arrived as Ukrainian Ambassador in Berlin. In the autumn of 1921 a third Ukrainian diplomat appeared in Warsaw in the person of Shumsky. Not one apparently of the unfortunates who decorated the Ukrainian Foreign Office is alive to-day; all, including Rakovski, were 'eliminated' later—either with or without trial.

In 1920–21 Ukrainian representatives abroad were officially independent of Moscow, but they were under the orders of Rakovski. There existed, however, a secret decision of the Politbureau, according to which the Foreign Office of the U.S.S.R. had the right to send instructions to the Foreign Office of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and could interfere in the activities of the Ukrainian diplomats in the Central European capitals.

This situation continued until the new Constitution of the Union, proclaimed on 6 July 1923. The Ukrainian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was then abolished. The Ukrainian representation abroad was fused with that of U.S.S.R.; but it was agreed that an Ukrainian Communist should be

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appointed as First Counsellor in the four capitals (Vienna was included) where the Ukrainians had had independent representation. This arrangement continued until 1925, when such appointments began to be considered only as 'desirable'. Ukrainian Communists soon vanished from important positions in the Soviet embassies and legations, and for the last thirteen years the Ukrainian S.S.R. has had not even the shadow of formal representation abroad. 648 ●

(13) *The Ukrainians in Poland*

The Paris Conference, in 1919, only recognized the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia pending a solution of 'the Russian Question'. The Polish position in Galicia was finally affirmed by the Council of the League of Nations (15 March 1923), but the Polish Government undertook to establish a 'gradual' autonomy for the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia. 563 668

The Ukrainians claimed that not less than three and a half millions of the population of Eastern Galicia were of Ukrainian stock, and they reckoned another three millions in Western Galicia, the Kholm region, and the Polish districts of Polesia and Volhynia.

The Polish census of 1939 admitted only 1,600,000 Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, while the population of Russian origin in other regions of Poland was not allowed to be even in part Ukrainian. This great disparity in estimates can be explained by the fact that the Poles described as 'Russians' all those elements, formerly 'pro-Muscovite', who were lukewarm in their support of the separatist version of the Ukrainian national movement.

- The Polish Government had some success in detaching from the Ukrainian nationalists a section of the rural population who were flattered by the discovery that they were in fact 'russified Polish *szlachta*'. It was affirmed that during the preceding two centuries many families of the lesser Polish nobility had become so impoverished that they had disappeared into the mass of the peasantry and had become the victims of systematic methods of russification. The movement of the so-called 'Szlachta Zagrodowa' (Smallholder Gentry) had great success, and the journal of the association, *Pobudki*, claimed recently that the number of 'russified *szlachta*' who were expected 'to return to the bosom of their mother Poland' amounted to 700,000 persons. Thus, if those who desired to remain Russian and those who desired to become Poles (together with real Poles, Jews, Armenians, and Germans) are deducted from the Ukrainian estimate, it will be found that the total number of *conscious* Ukrainians in all Galicia did not exceed two millions.

These two millions remain, however, an important factor in the Galician borderland where Polish, German, Russian, Roumanian and Hungarian interests are in dangerous conflict, and the energetic activities of Ukrainian groups and political parties continued to exercise a disturbing influence on the life of the Polish State during the whole period 1919–39.

The most important Ukrainian party is U.N.D.O. (The Ukrainian National Democratic Union (*Obyedinenie*)), which rose to importance about 1925 under the leadership of Dmitro Levitsky. The party could claim a membership of over one million, and it published a series of papers of which *Diio* (Action) in Lvov was the most important. The ultimate aim of

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Caucasus were not inferior to those of New Russia and climatic 311
conditions were much more favourable: rainfall, owing to the proximity of the great Caucasian ranges, was more regular. The Kuban region did actually become a granary. Rostov-on-the-Don grew and flourished in true 'American style'. A new grain port, Novorossiysk, was built and soon became a rival to Odessa.

Further railway development accompanied the exploitation of 496
the Donets coal-mines and the growth of a metallurgical industry 135
centred on the Krivoy Rog iron-ore deposits located to the west of
the Dniepr. Two parallel lines were constructed to pass through 311
Ekaterinoslav and the old district of the Zaporogian *Sech*, connecting the Donets basin with Krivoy Rog. Thus, simultaneously with the industrial development in the south and the flowering of the North Caucasian region, a new 'granary' and new regions of great mineral potential began at the turn of the century to impose a 'latitudinal' direction on railway construction: the opening of the great Siberian railway gave almost a priority to the possibilities of agricultural production in western and southern Siberia, and connected Chelyabinsk, through Ekaterinenburg, Vyatka and Vologda, with the Baltic ports. At the same time 'diagonal' development was proceeding far to the south-east through Turkestan to the frontiers of Afghanistan and the Chinese Empire.

The importance of the natural riches of Asiatic Russia came to be 311
realized with an ever-growing force during the reign of Nicholas II 648
(1896–1917). The principal economic axis of the Empire was evidently changing direction from the 'meridial' to the 'latitudinal'. The political policy of the Empire during the same period, with its emphasis on the Balkan Slavs and on the 'Byzantine' dreams of the epoch of Catherine II, was certainly archaistic in tendency and bore no relation to the fundamental realities of Eurasian geography.

The War of 1914–18 brought down in destruction that peculiarly hybrid cultural synthesis which was Romanov Russia; it obliterated at the same time the neo-Byzantine plans of the Pan-Slavists and weakened the whole position of Russia as a European power. The loss of a wide belt of territories (the whole inheritance of two hundred years of Romanov autocracy) between the Arctic and the Black Sea imposed on the new Soviet state the sheer necessity of a 'latitudinal' rather than a 'meridial' development. During the last two decades new efforts have been made to open up the agricultural and mineral wealth of the steppes beyond the Volga and the Ural in western and southern Siberia and of the valleys of the Altai and the Tien-Shan; and, while historic Russian ambitions in the Balkans

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311 and the Middle East have been left in suspense, a territory the size of
● 648 Europe and new routes into the heart of China and ultimately to the Pacific have been brought under Soviet control. Under these circumstances 'the wheat-fields of the Ukraine' receded again into the background and became of only local importance: the more so since, in the two Soviet 'Economic Plans', interest in South-Eastern Russia has been concentrated on the industrial development of the New Russian region. These conditions are illustrated by the growth of industrial centres like Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Lugansk, Zaporozhie, and the decline of the great grain port of Odessa.

311 The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine has never in fact justified the enthusiasm which it has inspired from the time of the seventeenth-century Polish poet quoted in an earlier context to the more recent period of Herr Hitler and his apostles of *Lebensraum*. The natural conditions of the Ukraine are such that they really generously reward agricultural labour, but they exact always patient, strenuous and systematic toil.

Natural conditions differ greatly over the expanse of the country which Michael Dragomanov considered to constitute 'Greater Ukraine'. The agricultural 'age' of these territories differs in the extreme. In New Russia agriculture is only a century old, while Galicia has supported a numerous population of husbandmen for nearly a thousand years.

162 *Galicia* is one of the oldest agricultural lands of all Europe and
134 conditions there have hardly altered since the days of Daniel and his
311 *boyars*. The Galician earth, black in the eastern part, is tired old soil,
167 impoverished by incessant labour, itself prompted and intensified by the ever-growing care of an ever-growing population to acquire its daily bread. Owing to the density of the population (110, and in some regions 132, inhabitants to the square kilometre) the area of holdings had been reduced to a minimum: 46 per cent of the farms comprise 2 hectares of land and sometimes less; 37 per cent comprise from 2 to 5 hectares. In a countryside where urban life has remained relatively stagnant live 75 per cent of the total population; while all commerce and crafts remain in the hands of the Jews in the large towns and in many of the villages, there is a 50 per cent surplus of hands among agricultural labourers. The peasants, Poles and Ukrainians alike, used to migrate to Germany and France as casual labour; before the last war they emigrated also in large numbers to Canada and the United States.

474 These arduous conditions of peasant life gradually developed a capacity for organization. Driven by necessity, the Galician peasantry set up a network of co-operatives for production and

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CHAPTER ONE

The Background of the Communist Triumph

642 648 No idea could be more erroneous than that the triumph of Communism in Ukraine and the destruction of the Ukrainian National Republic, which had declared its independence on January 22, 1918. was the choice of the Ukrainian people themselves. It did not suit their desires or their interests, and the methods which Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin adopted to master Ukraine were essentially the same as those by which the iron curtain has been pushed steadily to the west. Ukraine was the testing ground for the development of the Communist methods of conquest, just as it has been the testing ground for all the Communist methods of control of their helpless satellites.

From the moment when he arrived in Petrograd in April, 1917, Lenin commenced a policy of disintegration. The collapse of tsarist Russia had destroyed all of the organized forces of law and order throughout the empire, and it was no easy task to restore these in an area where there had not been allowed for centuries a popular government resting upon the will of the people and staffed by experienced democratic administrators. Under such conditions, Lenin's propaganda of self-determination for all the peoples of the empire fell upon ready ears, as did his efforts to promote class conflict on every hand. At the same time his promises to the Great Russians constantly called, under one guise or another, for the restoration of Russian unity even while his talk of internationalism and the Communist International seemed to imply a world Communist regime in which all peoples would be equal. It was this policy of lying and deceiving until the moment for successful armed intervention came that gave him the dominating position.

642 He enjoyed an immense advantage in the fact that the civil war
648 between the Whites and the Reds was largely fought on Ukrainian territory and thus compelled the young Ukrainian government to fight upon two fronts throughout the entire period, while for some time the new republic was forced also to oppose the Poles in the
[131] west. Lying as Ukraine did on the shore of the Black Sea, the armed forces of General Denikin, who was heading the effort to create an anti-Communist monolithic Russian government, could only reach Moscow by crossing Ukrainian territory. It was only across Ukrainian territory that the supplies sent to him by the Western nations after the ending of World War I could be delivered and it was his policy to allow no manifestation of Ukrainianism in any form, for he intended to continue that denial of Ukrainian existence that had characterized the old tsarist regime.

His efforts in this direction were aided by the unfortunate failure of the Western democratic powers which had triumphed in the war to understand either the nature of Bolshevism or the desires of the various national movements. At the same time his success was rendered impossible by the refusal of the West to back him in his efforts to restore all or most of the social and political order which had vanished with the abdication of the Tsar.

Thus with the White Russians and the Ukrainians locked in a desperate struggle, the way was open for Lenin to move with relative freedom on his path of disintegration and of conquest. He did not fail to take advantage of every opportunity, and the advances and retreats during the period from 1917 to 1920 and even later were but a preliminary for the later tactics of Communism.

On the other hand it cannot be denied that there existed in Ukraine certain factors which also worked to his advantage. The political and social system prevailing up to 1917 had not given any training in self-government to the Ukrainian people and in the midst of war and revolution they had to start on the most elementary tasks of popular education, while at the same time they corrected fundamental abuses in the economic situation and created and administered a government. Let us, therefore, look briefly at

186 discipline hampered them at every turn and ardent Ukrainians as 565 Mykola Skrypnyk, a personal and trusted friend of the Russian 668 Bolshevik leaders, refused to make any schism in the party, even 665 though he and his Ukrainian friends quite regularly appealed for recognition as a separate party, especially after the Bolsheviks recognized the existence of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic. He, as an old Bolshevik, however, refused to cooperate with those Ukrainian Bolsheviks who dared to risk a fight with the central committee in Moscow and who finally tried to set up a Ukrainian Communist Party.

[648] The greatest weakness of both of these intellectual groups was their lack of appreciation of the importance of foreign policies. It was with great hesitation that their representatives in the Central Rada in the summer of 1917 approached the Russian Provisional Government to include a Ukrainian representative in all Russian diplomatic missions. They had had few or no representatives in the pre-revolutionary Russian diplomatic service; relatively few of them had been abroad, even to Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; they had no distinguished Ukrainian emigrants abroad who could speak to the world with the great authority of Ignace Jan Paderewski, Thomas G. Masaryk or Michael I. Pupin and during the crucial early months they largely neglected any consideration of foreign policy.

They wasted precious time in futile negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government over questions of federalism and they turned rather slowly toward the idea of independence. At each move of the more nationally conscious toward this goal, a certain portion of the more leftist members drew away toward the appropriate Russian camp in the name of internationalism and thus became the unconscious tools by which both the Provisional Government and later the Bolsheviks hoped to retain their control of the wealth of Ukraine.

It was this vagueness on the part of many of the intellectuals which kept them from being true intermediaries between the nationalist and military groups and the great mass of the peasants. It weakened the energy and zeal of some of the Ukrainian regi-

the control of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the Rada, it abolished 186
all Ukrainian newspapers and its disorderly elements not only 642
executed members of the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie but 665
also Ukrainian Communists and radicals who used the Ukrainian language in their hearing.

In the meantime the Bolsheviks had opened negotiations with 648
the Germans in Brest-Litovsk where Trotsky claimed to speak for 186
the entire former Russian Empire. To circumvent this, the Rada 642
formally declared the full independence of Ukraine and sent dele- 665
gates to the peace conference. As a balance to this, Trotsky intro-
duced into the conference the representatives of this new Ukrainian [728]
Soviet Republic who claimed to be the spokesmen for the Ukrainian peasants and proletariat. Their arguments did not convince the Germans and Austrians, who saw greater possibilities of profit by recognizing the Ukrainian National Republic, so as to secure without fighting a large part of the Ukrainian grain supplies. The Ukrainian National Republic signed this agreement with misgivings, for, in fact, it threw the Rada into the power of the Germans and ended all chance of assistance from the Allied democratic powers which had previously regarded Lenin as the tool of the German General Staff. Now, with the conclusion of this peace, they extended their ill-will to the Ukrainian Central Rada.

The immediate result was German assistance to the Rada and the Soviet forces were quickly forced out of Ukraine and back into Great Russian territory. The leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet government were members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and could not raise the question as to whether or not their new state was actually independent, and whether it could be, if it did not have its own Communist Party associated on a par with the Russian Party in the Communist International.

This brief Communist interlude in Ukraine should have been most instructive to both the Allied powers and the Germans, but neither drew the true lessons from it. The Allies, who were still opposed to the principles of Bolshevism and were annoyed by the speeches of Zinovyev and Chicherin, became more friendly disposed to the Russian Whites and gave up their efforts to win through

648 invoking the democratic principles of self-determination the support
186 of any of the non-Russian peoples. The Germans, on the other
642 hand, after aiding the Rada to return, dispersed it on the ground
665 that it was too radical, but when a more conservative regime was
set up under Hetman Skoropadsky, they did not give this honest support. They sought only for Ukrainian supplies and by their actions they weakened the power of the Hetman and strengthened discontent against his regime without allowing him to do anything that would weaken the power of the Communists.

The situation became almost ridiculously complicated. Germany, anxious to secure troops for the Western Front, was, by the spring of 1918, at peace with both the Commissars of Moscow and the government of Ukraine. It was therefore opposed to both the White Russians and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Even the Czechoslovaks on their way to Vladivostok, thanks to the negotiations between President Masaryk and Muravyev, were on friendly terms with the Ukrainian Communists and had difficulties with the Ukrainian government and the Germans. As soon as they crossed into the Russian Soviet Republic, they had difficulties with the Russian Communists and the Germans and found their support among a part of the White Russians. It was the same situation as in the far north where the Germans backed the White Finnish forces under Mannerheim against the red Finns who were the favored party of their friend and associate, Moscow. Yet all the time there was no Ukrainian Communist Party, for the Ukrainian Communists owed their prime allegiance to the Russian Communist Party which was, in theory at least, on the opposite side in the general disturbed situation.

To the Communists, as Skrypnyk, Shakhray and George Pyatakov who had played an important role in the Communist occupation of Kiev, this seemed a serious gap and at a meeting in Tahanrih in April they triumphed over the Communists from Katerynoslav who had insisted upon remaining merely a part of the Russian Communist Party. Their victory was of short duration, for when there came an organization meeting in Moscow on July 5, the Russian authorities definitely made it clear that they would not tolerate

the existence of a Ukrainian Communist Party. Bela Kun warned 648
that in the international civil war that was to be begun, great 186
efforts were to be made not to allow it to assume anything of a 642
national character, but to keep it restricted and fought on class 665
lines. They were also informed that they could in this new struggle have no relations with Mensheviks or any Ukrainian Social Revolutionists or Social Democrats. A few months later Stalin was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian party as a symbol of the dependence in which the party was to be kept.

The first people to appreciate fully the dilemma in which the Ukrainian Communists found themselves were the Ukrainian Communist leaders who had established, with Russian help, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were quickly taught that as long as the control of their Party was not in their own hands, they were completely helpless and at the mercy of the Russians.

Shakhray, who had endeavored to argue at Kiev in December, 1917 that the Ukrainian Communists were to be counted as Ukrainians, very soon in Russia became so disgusted that he resigned from the Russian Communist Party and retired to Saratov to establish a Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He criticized the extreme policy of centralization carried on by the Russian Communists.

Along with S. Mazlakh, he published a book entitled *The Wave—What is being done in Ukraine and with Ukraine.* This book, which was often quoted later by Skrypnyk and his associates, was the theoretical basis for Ukrainian Communism. Shakhray tried to foster discontent against the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky by stressing his relations with both the German forces in Ukraine and the White Russian refugees who had taken shelter in that country. He declared that Ukrainian independence could only be consistently won by the Ukrainian Communists, for they, as the Ukrainian proletariat, were the only people who could advocate and carry through a real revolution in view of the treachery of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, he attributed the Communist failure in Ukraine to the fact that the Party was entirely under

648 Russian control and looked at the cause of the Communists through
186 the eyes of the Russian colonists in Ukraine who were, in accord-
642 ance with the Russian imperialistic tradition, working not for
665 Ukraine but for Moscow.

He soon left Saratov for Kuban and here he was captured and killed by the Denikin forces. Mazlakh, who had remained a member of the Russian Communist Party, was later shot by them for nationalism. The third Commissar for War, Neronovych, became disillusioned and on the entrance of German troops into Ukraine he gave up politics but he fell into the hands of the Ukrainian National Army and was shot. Thus, the first attempts of the Russian Communist Party to seize Ukraine and expel the Ukrainian National government ended disastrously and relatively few of the early leaders survived. Most of them paid the penalty for their actions to one of the contending forces, with the Bolsheviks executing then or later the larger number.

During the summer of 1918 while Hetman Skoropadsky remained in power, the chief work which the Communists could hope to do in Ukraine was through their mission in Kiev under the leadership of D. Z. Manuilsky. This was ostensibly engaged in negotiations for a definite peace treaty between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In reality, Manuilsky was almost openly intriguing with the tacit consent of the Germans who had no desire to see their own position in Moscow jeopardized, as their armies were being driven back on the Western Front. Manuilsky was also able to notice the constant splitting of the leftist Ukrainian parties, which, in their hostility to the policies of the Hetman, tended to move nearer to the Communist position.

The disintegration in both the Social Revolutionist and the Social Democrat ranks became steadily more marked during the summer of 1918. When the German armies collapsed and the Hetman could no longer retain his post, a Directory of five men, including Petlyura and Vynnychenko, set themselves up at the news of the abdication of the German Emperor and they soon recovered Kiev. At the same time the left wing of the Social

Revolutionists (Borotbisty) refused to recognize the new Directory 648
and drifted rapidly toward the Bolshevik position. 186

The Kremlin, sensing the great change in the Ukrainian situation, 642
at once refurbished the idea of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. 665
Its real head was now Christian Rakovsky, a Rumanian with Bulgarian citizenship who had never been in Ukraine, but its nominal leaders were Pyatakov and George Kotsyubynsky. These moved from Kursk along the railroad lines into Ukraine at the end of December but Chicherin, in his telegrams to the Directory, categorically denied that the Russians were supporting this movement in any way. He laid all the responsibility upon the Ukrainian Communists. The ruse did not work and finally on January 16, 1919, the Directory, in which Vynnychenko's star was sinking, declared war.

This was opposed by the left wing of the Social Democrats who were very influential in the Directory. On January 10-12, the two wings definitely parted and the left adopted the name of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Independent) and insisted upon the establishment of a non-Communist Soviet Republic. The right wing, in view of the weakness of the Ukrainian proletariat, advocated instead a Congress of Workers which would include both peasants and the city proletariat. When war actually started, the left wing split again between those who were willing to stand for an independent Ukraine and those who refused to act against Russia under any circumstances. The latter took the name of USDRP (Independent Lefts).

It was not long before the Borotbisty and the USDRP (Independent Lefts) began negotiations for merging. Both were convinced of the superiority of the Soviet form of democratic government and both were convinced that any Communist government would inevitably recognize the essential rights of the Ukrainian people. In this respect they were far more naive than were the leaders of the first Ukrainian Communist regime who had already become completely disillusioned at the contrast between the theories and the practice of Lenin and his associates. They refused to cooperate with Petlyura and the Directory and, in effect, they with-

648 drew from its support a considerable section of the Ukrainian in-
186 tellectuals at a crucial moment.

642 On the other hand, with their own armies they fought against
665 the White Russians of Denikin, because they saw in these merely an attempt to restore the old order. Yet they declined to be included in the organized army of the Directory and by their independent actions they made more difficult the burden of the army commanders. They encouraged the formation in the country of independent military bands which added to the growing chaos. To emphasize their position they again changed their name to the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and constantly sought to ingratiate themselves with the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party which had again succeeded in reoccupying Kiev and in forcing the Directory to flee.

On the other hand, the USDRP (Independents), almost as true admirers of the Soviet system but far more critical of the Russian influence, did merge their forces for the fighting against Denikin with the forces of the Directory. In the summer of 1919, this group, under the influence of the Khmelevtsevs of Kobilyaky in Poltavshchyna, commenced again to review their position. After the death of their leaders in a crossing of the Dnieper and after the defeat of Denikin, they decided to adopt the appellation of Communists and to rename themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party without any additional description title. Thus, they took the name of Ukapisty and as such they dragged on an independent existence for some years, confidently expecting that they would ultimately receive national and international recognition from the Comintern, the Communist International.

This endless splitting and regrouping of the various parties proved a headache to the Directory which was trying to organize the country for defense against both of the Russian invaders. The individual armed forces, acting independently, aided in wrecking the economy and this inspired peasant leaders of various kinds to seek the control of their own native regions. Some of these men proved themselves able, if short-sighted, leaders. Some, as Nestor Makhno, were unadulterated anarchists who saw no need of any

central regime. Others were mere adventurers thrown into prom- 648
inence by the course of events and willing to shift their principles 186
for the sake of a momentary personal advantage. Others were 642
patriots with no broader vision than their home districts. 665

As a result, throughout 1919 there were some 328 revolts against the extending power of the Russian Communist forces which were fanning out over Ukraine, slaughtering and robbing as they went but still unable to secure a definite control of the villages.

As opposed to this welter of conflicting ideals, the policy of the Russian dominated Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party was simplicity and clarity itself. This supported the paper independence of the Ukrainian Soviet regime and openly avowed its intention of subjugating the country and of exploiting it for the benefit of Moscow. Their purposes were even openly avowed at the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies on March 22, 1919, when Shlikhter, a Ukrainian German and one of the commissars appointed by Moscow to collect grain, declared: "You all remember how Ukraine began to become Soviet; with every day of the advance of the Red Army, we and you felt more easy; the rich grain-producing Ukraine is ours. We have four central military divisions collecting and on them we rest all our hopes. We have a mass of workmen sent in (from Moscow to Ukraine), who know how to search all the Ukrainian villages. We always remember that the eyes of the proletariat of Russia are turned toward Ukraine."

These remarks represented the cynical attitude of Lenin and the Communists. They ignored the statements as to a Ukrainian Soviet Republic that were being made by Lenin and others to woo the various leftist Ukrainian parties. They were safe speeches made to reassure the Great Russians that the Bolsheviks still had a monolithic outlook, even though they were prepared to go to almost any lengths to create a paper regime which would insure and facilitate the plundering of the rich grain-producing Ukraine. They told, more or less, the truth, that was not recognized by the more idealistic theoreticians, that the Ukrainian Communists were, in fact, the dupes and victims of the Moscow regime which cared nothing for the Ukrainian people, or even the Ukrainian proletariat.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

●648 By the end of 1919 the Ukrainian Soviet regime was so satis-
186 fied with the success of its raiding and collecting parties that it felt
642 able to proclaim an amnesty and to disarm the population com-
665 pletely. To accomplish the latter purpose, new Russian forces were sent into the country, the villages were thoroughly searched and disarmed. The peasants were tiring of the apparently endless exactions of the independent commanders and they turned against many of the patriotic partisan bands and declined to give them further support. This broke the movement and even the alliance of Petlyura with the Poles and the short occupation of Kiev by the combined armies in the spring of 1920 did not suffice to restore the old enthusiasm for the hard-pressed Directory.

By the end of 1920, when the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet delegations met the Poles in Riga in October, 1920, the fighting was nearly over. The Poles signed a treaty of peace without consulting their Ukrainian allies of the Ukrainian National Republic. There was nothing for the forces of the Directory to do but to retire abroad and continue their unsuccessful efforts to secure Western assistance. This was not forthcoming. The French were interested in aggrandizing Poland as a bulwark against Germany; the other allies were openly supporting Denikin through a misinterpreted friendship with the Russian people and there did not seem to be left even a spark of the principles enunicated but a short time before in Wilson's attitude toward self-determination and the rights of people to govern themselves. The struggle was ended and the Ukrainians were left at the mercy of their Russian overlords, now back in a new guise.

471 industry and factories by the workers and they did their best to inflame the workers and peasants against the great landlords and the factory owners and administrators. In this they succeeded admirably and the already low standard of living in the Russian Empire began to drop lower and lower.

Under such conditions it became more and more necessary for the Soviet leaders in Moscow to make renewed efforts to master Ukraine and to inject some apparent vitality into their puppet, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. In this they were finally successful, but even though the Communists came back into Ukraine, they did not venture to destroy the fiction of Ukrainian independence, although they had no intention of allowing it to develop.

642 From the moment of its formation and adoption of a Com-
648 munist Constitution on March 14, 1919, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic declared itself an independent and sovereign state. It was recognized with all due pomp and formality by Lenin, who again stressed it in his *Letters to the Workmen and Peasants of Ukraine* in his efforts to strengthen the opposition to Denikin. The Ukrainian Soviet Government was represented at the Conference in Riga that ended the Soviet-Polish War in the fall of 1920. The travesty was continued when, in December of the same year, Lenin concluded with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic a formal treaty of alliance in which Ukraine, for purposes of defense, graciously handed over to Moscow the commissariats of war, navy, foreign trade, railroads, finances, labor, posts and telegraphs and the Supreme Council of National Economy. It still retained the right to have its own diplomatic representatives in Poland, Germany and Austria, countries which had recognized the Ukrainian National Republic, and there were still preserved Ukrainian military schools to train officers for the Ukrainian army in both Kharkiv, the capital of Soviet Ukraine, and Kiev.

Still all this was merely a sham arrangement, for the bulk of the forces that fought against the Ukrainian National Republic were Russian and they operated with no regard for the feelings even of the Ukrainian Communists. They moved at will over Ukrainian territory, collected supplies at will and shipped them

to Russia and they behaved in every way as if they were in their 642
own territory. 648

The key to this enigma[1] is to be found in the fact that the 665
Ukrainian Communist Party was not regarded as an independent Communist Party with a seat in the Comintern, but was merely a branch of the Russian Communist Party. Its officers were therefore appointed at will and changed at the pleasure of the Russian Party. Its discipline and actions were controlled by Moscow and any independent Ukrainian development could be countermanded by a mere word from the centre. By this extremely simple device Lenin could maintain his hold over the Ukrainian Communists, even in the unlikely case that the Comintern was revitalized by the Communist seizure of power in another of the large states.

The policy did not fail to arouse criticism, even during the wars, by some of the Ukrainian members of the Party. In 1920, a "fraction of the federalists" was formed under Yu. Lapchynsky with the aid of S. Kirychenko, P. Slynko and E. Kasyanenko. It was naturally dissolved as soon as its importance was recognized, and its leaders were expelled from the Party. They accordingly joined the Ukapisty and only returned when that voluntarily liquidated itself some years later.

There were thus at the moment of the ending of the Civil Wars three Communist Parties in Ukraine, the official KP/b/U, the branch of the Russian Party, the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and the Ukapisty, i.e. the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The Borotbisty were the first to go. They had been formed out of the Left Social Revolutionists and were less sure of their Marxian knowledge but they contained many of the leftist Ukrainian intellectuals who valued the development of Ukrainian culture. The group had been praised by Lenin for its great part in the defeat of Denikin. In the spring of 1920, the proposal was made that they fully join the Ukrainian Branch of the Russian Communist Party. Shumsky and Blakytny led the affirmative. The spokesmen for the opposition were Poloz and Panas Lyubchenko, who was later to be the head of the UkSSR and to commit suicide in 1937. The

[1] [sham independence of Ukraine from 1919 on --Analyst]

national independence and he set himself to do the same in Kiev and Kharkiv. 645 871

Without wavering in his devotion to the principles of Communism, he attacked the problem in the broadest possible way. 186 665 He stimulated derussification by supporting the Ukrainian press, theatre and schools. Under his influence and work, the cities, including Kharkiv, where Ukrainian influence had been relatively weak, came to be predominantly Ukrainian and in smaller places it became very rare to hear Russian spoken. The State Printing House and the smaller cooperative publishing houses produced almost nothing that was not in Ukrainian and during the few years that he remained in control, there were more Ukrainian books published than in the preceding century and a half.

Skrypnyk was still not satisfied. He extended his activity and patronage of things Ukrainian to all those areas in the RSFSR where Ukrainians were living in compact settlements. He provided Ukrainian papers, books and theatres for those who were living in Kurshchyna, Voronizhshchyna, along the Volga, Kuban, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and the Far East. He sent educated men and women to establish schools and other cultural institutions and, for the first time in history, efforts were made to establish a real community of interests among all the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

More than that, he held out a friendly hand to Western Ukraine, [648] which was under Polish rule. Although by this time the entire control of foreign affairs was concentrated in Moscow, Skrypnyk was allowed to arrange for a Ukrainian consul in Lviv and Yur. Lapchynsky, a former Ukapist, was appointed to the post. The consul's duty was to win support for the Communists in Eastern Galicia and, in pursuance of this purpose, Skrypnyk, too, paid a visit to Lviv. He had a certain success in his work and a few Western Ukrainians, as S. Rudnytsky, who came from Prague to become the head of the Ukrainian Institute of Geography and Cartography in Kharkiv, and the mathematician Chaykivsky, entered the UkSSR. They formed a special club in Kharkiv and had their own literary organization "Western Ukraine." Skrypnyk

731 the country might have escaped, had it not been for the methods of the government in draining off from the population the last possible reserves of food.

731/185 There can be no doubt that this was done deliberately, for every measure taken by the government was intended to increase the difficulties of the population and to prepare for the final crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance that had been proceeding with ever ● [648] increasing force. Every measure, too, was intended to render it more difficult for the outside world to secure any actual knowledge of the conditions in the country until it was too late for the world to do more than register vain protests, for it was very definitely at this period that the censorship methods of the government and its apprehensions of what knowledge might bring to the world actively commenced to draw an iron curtain around Ukraine. Foreign correspondents were forbidden to visit Ukraine on one pretext or another and they were forced to send out such news as the government wished or to leave the Soviet Union.

[661] The collectivization and the famine had coincided with the beginning of the attack on Ukrainian scholarship and the arts, as we shall see, but these attacks by their very choice of victims had been directed against those men who had not been closely connected with the Communist Party in the past, even though they had not been entirely hostile. Along with the famine the tide turned, and soon the victims were those persons who had dared to hope for an equality of treatment (with the Great Russians) in the Soviet Union.

The famine was obviously intended not only to crush the population already impoverished by the collectivization but to administer a sound chastisement to all classes who were interested in the preservation and development of local and republic interests.

731/648 The famine was at its height in the winter and spring of 1933 and was only somewhat alleviated after the harvest of that year was brought in. It was only natural that, despite the efforts of the authorities, word of it would gradually seep out, in spite of the censorship. The news was most accessible to the Western Ukrainians, for as yet all communications had not been satisfactorily broken, and early in the summer they began to seek permission to organize relief

abroad for the benefit of the sufferers. On July 14, 1933, such a 731
body was already formed in Lviv and soon in the other sections of 648
Western Ukraine, while their appeals were heard by the Ukrainian
emigrés abroad.

In August, Theodore Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna had been convinced of the truth of the famine and he appealed for aid for the starving. In the same month the General Secretary of the Congress of European Minorities published his summary of the conditions, as gleaned from all available sources, and the League took action at its meeting in September. In the same month the matter was brought up before the League of Nations in Geneva and relief was referred to the International Red Cross.

The movement spread to the Ukrainians in North America and on November 3, 1933, the sixth convention of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States appealed to the government of the United States, urging that an impartial commission be sent to Ukraine to report on the truth of these reports.

This growing wave of protests among the Ukrainians and the [208]
emigrants from Ukraine was met by a stony silence on the part of the Soviet authorities, by absolute denial or by charges of unfriendly propaganda. The Soviet government refused to lift its barrier on any visits to Ukraine by foreign journalists or by any foreign visitors until after the harvest of 1933 was brought in and then they induced such journalists as Walter Duranty to recant previous statements as to the extent of the famine and report on September 18, 1933, that the harvest of that year was excellent "and all talk of famine now is ridiculous."

Almost the first detailed account of an American journalist was 731
given by William Henry Chamberlin on May 29, 1934, on his 185
return from the Soviet Union, when he estimated that between four and five million peasants were starving and he also quoted the speech of President Kalinin of the Soviet Union, made the year before, "The collective farmers have passed through a good school. For some, this school was quite ruthless."

This was a polite hint again that it had been the policy of the government to allow the famine to run its course in the hope of

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

731 185 breaking any possible opposition on the part of the collective farms and the individual peasants.

The famine then on the domestic scene marked a definite turning point, a definite shift of emphasis in the relations between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, and that shift was extended to the individual Ukrainian. Yet, the very reports that emanated from the stricken country were not without their significance for the world.

731 648 1933 was a fateful year for Europe. The order to apply the maximum pressure on the Ukrainians came on January 24th. On January 28th, just four days later and before the news could have leaked out, Kurt von Schleicher resigned as Chancellor of Germany and was succeeded by Adolf Hitler. Within a month came the Reichstag fire and all the turmoil connected with the advent of the Nazis to power.

A world that had still not been fully convinced of the dangers of the Communist regime was only too ready to magnify its benefits and its possibilities for good as compared with the apparently more pressing menace of Hitler. The period of the popular fronts began in all the European countries and it coincided with the coming into power of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the American bank crisis.

Under such circumstances, the rumors of the Ukrainian famine were heavily discounted by all except the most bitter anti-Communists and they obtained short hearing before world public opinion. No one wanted to believe these reports, and the troubled conditions when the reaction to the right seemed the menace to a world desirous of peace made it seem logical that the democratic world could secure some aid in its struggle from the Communist regime. All the old talk of the artificiality of the Ukrainian struggle that had circulated in 1918 was now reburnished and repropagandized.

The result might have been expected but it showed Stalin and the Soviet leaders that they had played their course well. They secured recognition by the United States in November of the same year, just as the real news of the extent of the tragedy was beginning

to leak out. Anger and disgust at Hitler was the dominant mood 731
and behind that veil, the Soviet leaders were able to plan their 648
further actions.

It is hard to tell what might have been the result, had the 000
world awakened in that year to a realization of the dangers from the two totalitarian leaders, who were later to unite and start World War II. Yet already the evidence was there, if men would only understand.

In the period of Militant Communism the victims had been chosen more or less at random and the world was largely aghast at the results, even though they did not understand. Now, by deliberate action the same thing was being done on a larger scale and under the guise of law and order. This method proved successful and advanced the Soviet Union to a place of preeminence among nations, while it enabled the authorities to dupe many idealists in other countries.

From this point of view the deportation of the kurkuls in 1930-1 and the famine of 1932-3 represented the use of new methods of terror as an instrument of national policy. That policy was continued in the massacre of the Polish officers in Katyn and the Ukrainian peasants in Vinnytsya. It was continued in the purges that marked the thirties and in the show political trials that have marked the history of Communist rule in the satellite countries. They were the inauguration of a new policy that was not to meet with failure until its extremes began again by their ruthlessness to disturb an uneasy world in the days of the new cold war.

in the eastern Ukraine in the course of twenty years. At first their 728
actions were moderate but with the passage of time they began to develop and to reveal those tendencies which had marked their course in the east.

The first task was the reorganization of the country geographic- [648] ●
ally. On September 28[1] they had come to a new agreement with the Germans, whereby Germany had given up her claims to Lithuania in return for the area between the San and the Buh Rivers. So the Soviets assigned Wilno and its territory to an independent Lithuania; they annexed the region further south to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the rest to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This left to the Germans four sections of Western Ukraine, Kholmshchyna, Pidlyashshya, Posannya, and Lemkivshchyna, which were included in the Polish Government General and were governed directly by the Nazis, who allowed the appointment of a Ukrainian Central Committee to represent the Ukrainians before the higher authorities, especially in question of relief, etc.

The Soviet territory[2] was divided into six districts with their 728
centres at Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, Rivne and 631
Lutsk. Each of these was then divided into rayons or regions with about 25,000 population. The centres of these regions were often small towns but the division was made quite arbitrarily and each centre was amply provided with bureaucratic machinery.

The economic condition of the country was extremely bad and [433]
the only saving feature was that the harvest had already been gathered, so that there was a good chance for a large part of the agricultural population, even of the poor, to survive during the winter. Yet the influx of refugees fleeing before the German advance filled the cities and the severance of connections with the west prevented the arrival of any more manufactured goods or supplies and, of course, none came from the east.

On the contrary, there came a new swarm of Soviet officials who 436
were themselves amazed at the wealth of goods in what, to the natives, seemed impoverished markets. They brought with them liberal sums of money to buy whatever they wished and they were

[1] [1939 -- Analyst]

[2] [of occupied Poland -- Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER NINETEEN

The Soviets and the Ukrainians in Rumania

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563 The agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union[1] had stated that the former was not interested in the fate of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, both of which contained a large Ukrainian population. It was therefore obvious that once the Soviet hands were freed from the Soviet-Finnish war, they would endeavor to acquire these additional territories.

In both Bukovyna and Bessarabia the Ukrainian cause had been less developed, although there had been far more work in Bukovyna than in Bessarabia, which had been under Russian rule. The Ukrainian uprising in Chernivtsy had not been successful in 1918 and when the territory was added to Rumania, that country put a stop to all Ukrainian work, including education although a Ukrainian theatre had developed and there was considerable secret work being done.

As a result, there was a sense of stagnation which was very different from the situation in the lands under Poland. There was less sense of coordination and when in June, 1940, the Soviets requested Rumania to hand over the new provinces, Rumania had only to submit. Most of Bukovyna and the part of Bessarabia inhabited by Ukrainians were annexed to the UkSSR. The rest of Bessarabia was added to the Moldavian ASSR, which was later raised to the dignity of a Union Republic and intended for propaganda use against Rumania.

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631 The Soviet policy was then much the same as it had been in the area taken over from Poland. There was the same amount of propaganda declaring the "liberation" of the country from the Rumanian nobles and from international capitalism. There was

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[1] [1939--Analyst]

[164 blank]

648 the same voting for annexation to the USSR, the same enthusiastic
631 reception in Moscow, and the same process of nationalization, of the arrest of outstanding figures, and the same destruction of the established forms of life in both areas.

The Soviets were, however, less advanced in these provinces for the application of their system required time and their stay in the area was eight months less than it was in the territory taken from Poland.

The anti-Communist leaders fled either into Rumania proper
[668] or Germany or made their way to the Polish Government General in Krakow. On the other hand, despite the attempts to seal off the country, the OUN found ways of extending its influence into Bukovyna and appealed to the more alert classes of the population.

In general the Ukrainians in these two areas formed rather a
563 secluded enclave in the general mass of Ukrainian history and they did not play a role in proportion to their numbers. They thus scarcely enter into the account, although for a while, in 1941, there was organized a force of some 2,000 who sought to impede the Rumanian return to the country. Yet, their opposition was fruitless and when they endeavored to cut their way out, they were either destroyed by the Germans or dispersed.

CHAPTER TWENTY

The German Attack on the Soviets

During the period from 1939 to 1941, the German 648 ●
policy toward those Ukrainians who had escaped from the Soviet 563
occupation into the Polish Government General was not too severe.
It was possible for the Ukrainians in Krakow and elsewhere to
carry on a considerable amount of educational work, to form themselves
into relief organizations and, in general, to work for the
establishment of normal relations.

When the breach between the two totalitarian states came on 721
June 22, 1941, the Germans pushed ahead rapidly not only in
the Baltic area but also in Ukraine. By June 30, they had occupied
Lviv with the aid of some Ukrainian units, both from Carpatho-Ukraine
and from Galicia.

During these days the Ukrainians had high hopes that the
Germans would seriously liberate them from Bolshevik tyranny
and wherever they had the slightest possibility, they endeavored to
seize the cities so as to put a stop to the massacres which the Communists
were perpetrating before they fell back. In some places
they were successful but in Lviv, the Communists killed over [661]
10,000 prisoners, before their bloody regime could be brought to
an end.

In the first days of the war, although there were no clear 642
promises made to the Ukrainians, the impression grew that there
would be established some form of a Ukrainian administration.
The political leaders set up a Ukrainian government and appointed
Yaroslav Stetsko as the first head of the state on June 30, 1941.
A short time later this was broadened by the appointment of a
Committee of Seniors under the leadership of Dr. Kost Levytsky,
who had been the Prime Minister of the Republic of Western

642 Ukraine in 1918. These developments had the support of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, although he knew that they did not yet rest on organized public sentiment.

It was well recognized by the influential Ukrainians that the situation was very different from what it had been at the end of the Hapsburg monarchy, but they went through the motions of setting up a government on the possibility that the Germans would allow them some real concessions and that it would be mutually advantageous to be already prepared for all eventualities.

721 It is perhaps possible that a part of the German armed forces ● 648 looked with a certain toleration at these developments, for at least a part of the officer class realized that the task of the German government would be greatly facilitated, if they were able to normalize the situation and win some support from the population, as they had in the Polish Government General. This did not suit the Nazi element who believed that the advance of the German [661] forces was only to secure more *Lebensraum* for Germany. This faction struck and struck hard at the new regime and secured the arrest of Stetsko, Levytsky, Bandera and Melnyk, all of whom were taken to prison in Germany where they were kept for nearly four years.

The arrest of the leaders, while it was a crushing blow, still was not completely fatal. The advance of the German troops was so rapid on the way to Kiev that the Ukrainian leaders continued for some months to inspire the population not to resist the Germans, the more so as the western regiments of the Red Army surrendered in large masses. Thus when Kiev fell, some 675,000 of the Red Army surrendered with scarcely a blow.

On the other hand, the Soviets attempted to devastate the country before they withdrew, shooting the Ukrainian intelligentsia indiscriminately and trying to seize as many as they could for evacuation beyond the Urals. They demolished factories, tried to remove finished articles and mined the cities before they abandoned them. Then, when they exploded the mines, they spread the story that the total work of demolition had been carried on by the Germans.

On August 1, the Germans made a new division of the country 648 ●
and assigned the whole of Galicia to the Polish Government General. 727
At the same time they returned Bukovyna and Bessarabia to Rumania and then set up a new section around Odesa under the name of Transdnistria which they likewise placed under Rumania. It was in vain that the Ukrainians who tried to organize their own national rada in Kiev protested against such actions, for their protests were not received and the Nazis went on with their policy of ignoring all the wishes of the population.

Later in the month, the Germans established the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine and placed it under the control of a fanatical Nazi, Erich Koch, who set himself during the next years to crush anything and everything that was done to aid the Ukrainians and to win for himself the detested title of the butcher of Ukraine. 727 661

In the early months of the German occupation and especially during the period of rapid military movements, much was done for the rebuilding of the country after the ravages of the Bolsheviks. Nearly 115 Ukrainian newspapers were established, plans were made for the opening of schools and during the transition from the military rule to the rule of Koch, the Ukrainian agents were in the front ranks of the German army, spreading their propaganda and trying to rouse the population against the Bolsheviks. [727]

Yet this work did not please the Germans. Everywhere in eastern Europe the old governments that had been suppressed by the Bolsheviks tried to recreate themselves but everywhere there came the arrests of these leaders and their deportation, so that it was not many months before the sober thought of the liberated peoples turned against the new occupants and the people realized that their hopes were going to be in vain. By the end of 1941, it had been made clear to them that there would be no relaxation of the pressure exerted upon them.

In the Reichskommissariat which, in fact, represented little more than the right bank of the Dnieper area, for the army retained the control over the regions to the east of the river, it speedily became impossible for the Ukrainians to improve their own condition. The Germans were guided by a strictly logical program.

menacing their lines of communication and rescuing young Ukrainians who were being deported for labor service in Germany. It 668 725 was during this year that the leaders came to feel the need for closer cooperation and a unification of their efforts. This was hard to achieve and there were even clashes between different groups of Ukrainian patriots. Yet, toward the beginning of 1943 the more important groups had effected a rough union in the U. P. A., the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which took on the characteristics of an organized military force.

By the middle of 1943 this army had acquired considerable strength and it was able to deal shattering blows to isolated German detachments and to drive out both the local German administration and any Red partisans that tried to operate in the area around the Pripet marshes. In May, 1943, they were even strong enough to ambush and kill the head of the Nazi S. A., Viktor Lutze, in the neighborhood of Kowel-Brest Litovsk.

The policy of the U. P. A. was to destroy the local German administrations which were scattered in the smaller communities and to avoid battle with the greater concentration of forces in some of the leading centres. In this way the Ukrainians were able to take over the practical administration of large parts of the Ukraine and to restore a considerable amount of normal life, while they checked the deportation of thousands or released them from the slave trains. The U. P. A. during these years had its own training schools, it set up on a small scale its own factories for arms and some of the most necessary manufactures, and it governed with the approval of the Ukrainian population.

At this period it had its own printing presses and put out a large number of journals and books of various kinds. These were not only in Ukrainian but, as the U. P. A. grew in size and strength, it attracted the attention and won the sympathies of all the other nations oppressed by the Russians. It formed units of [648] Byelorussians, Azerbaijanians, Uzbeks, etc. and finally on November 21, 1944, it called the First Conference of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia, which was attended by some thirty-nine delegates representing thirteen peoples. The Germans

725 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A.
668 had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrainians were loyal to the Soviet Union. [208] This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided [186] to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

[657] The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

728 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of
● 648 the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

in 1939, now received a new master: As soon as the Soviet forces 728
entered the region in the autumn of 1944, they immediately began 648
a campaign to liberate this area from Czecho-Slovakia and reunite it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the same old story carried on in the same way as in 1939. There was a mass of petitions apparently prepared by the native population asking for liberation, but these were in reality the work of a handful of carefully selected Communists.

They speedily reached their goal and on June 29, 1945, President Benes of Czechoslovakia recognized the justice of their claims and by an agreement handed over the entire province which was duly reunited with their brothers in Moscow. This brought together under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic nearly all the Ukrainians, except a few who were still living in Poland and in a small stretch of territory which the UkSSR voluntarily ceded to Poland to satisfy the increasing claims of the Polish Communists and their needs in their efforts to cement their power in that state.

At the same time the realization by the Soviet authorities of the seriousness of the situation offered by the U. P. A. and the unrest among the Ukrainians led them to act on both the foreign
and the domestic front. On the former they mobilized all of their [208]
friends and dupes abroad to stress the connection of the U. P. A., [725]
the "Bandera bandits," and the Nazi criminals and they achieved considerable success in closing the eyes of the west until they had won considerable victories over the various U. P. A. groups, for too many Western leaders failed to see the inconsistency that they preached. At one and the same time the Soviet authorities boasted of their complete control of the territory of Western Ukraine, thanks to the love of the population for the Red Army and in almost the same breath they declaimed against these armed forces which were holding up the advance of the Red Army and the NKVD in the very areas where the people were thirsting for liberation.

On the domestic front in the autumn of 1945 they sent a large 661
force of men into the Carpathian area under the command of 668
Khrushchov as Premier of the UkSSR and General Ryasny, the 725

722 814 no efforts were made to bring them together or to conduct a revival of the Ukrainian work that had been so ruthlessly and needlessly shattered. It was a wartime device adopted for a passing situation and the masters in the Kremlin well understood that the fury of the war had done more than they had ever dreamed possible for the disintegration of the various Soviet Republics. Once, therefore, the evacuation had taken place, the Soviet leaders had only to sit by and to reap the profits. There would be plenty of time for that later and so the war years seemed an intermission in the relentless pressure that had been exerted in the past.

648 661 [167] It was for the Soviet leaders a far more vital problem to recover the masses of the people who had fled to the west or had been carried away by the Germans and who might, even in case of a victory of the democratic powers, reveal the full force of the Soviet pressure. That was why they welcomed the Yalta Agreement which provided for the compulsory return to the USSR of all refugees and deported persons and why, once peace was restored, they showed such devilish ingenuity in trying to recover the control of every one who could testify from personal experience as to the nature of the Soviet rule.

It was with the greatest surprise and lack of comprehension that the Western leaders became aware of this situation. They had listened eagerly to the Soviet siren songs that it was only Nazi sympathizers and criminals and traitors who did not want to return under the Soviet rule and it required some months before supposedly serious statesmen recovered their equilibrium sufficiently to understand the way in which they had been duped in the middle of the war.

Yet, no sooner had Soviet rule been reestablished than the old processes were revived with even greater energy and vigor. The last masks of independence or of free thought in the cultural or economic fields were torn away and the old persecution and charges were pressed with every increasing zeal.

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.

727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
● 648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representa-
[701] tive in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian 631
Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own 648
national flag.

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were 665
assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian 661
Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation.

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 727
was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies.

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. [316]
Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to

ment of a Ukrainian independent state throughout the period, 795
until the Russian Communists secured control and were able to 659
maintain their assumption of power.

In the first stages, while the Communists still hoped for the success of the world revolution, they emphasized their doctrines of atheism and they stressed the conception that "religion was the opium of the people." At the same time they endeavored to disintegrate the Russian Orthodox Church from within by giving their support to the various schemes of reform as the Living Church, etc. They also gave especial favor to various Protestant bodies, as the Baptists, who sought to introduce their ideas, often with marked success.

It was a crucial period for eastern Europe, for the Western 648
nations and America which had been victorious in World War I were not inclined to cement their victory. No matter what they thought of the Communist regime, Great Britain and the United States were still convinced that the victory of a democratic Russia was a certainty and they refused to take any steps to help the non-Russian peoples who were being over-whelmed by the Soviets, lest it prejudice their future relations with Russia. France, obsessed with the fear of Germany, was seeking to restore a greater Poland which would absorb as much as possible of Ukraine. The memory of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk blinded everybody to events as they were taking place.

It was no less critical for the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Allies sympathized with his position but the successful revolt of Mustapha Kemal against the Treaty of Sèvres produced a situation where the Western powers had to fight or surrender. They wished to do neither and with a certain Bolshevik sympathy for Turkey, the Patriarch was obliged to be cautious, until his hands were in a way freed by the settlement of Lausanne.

Hence the leaders of the movement for a Ukrainian Autocephal- 795
ous Orthodox Church were in a way powerless to regulate their relations with Orthodoxy as a whole. They had been unable to secure the support and assistance of any Russian bishops. They

642 came from the Russian workers of the cities, or from outside the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government under Petliura was to a considerable extent discredited, because it had failed to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the peasantry and to [648] establish law and order. Moreover, by an eleventh-hour alliance with Poland, it had compromised its claim to represent the entire Ukrainian nation. This resulted from the fact that Galicia, which, upon the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy had formed its own West Ukrainian Republic, was surrendered to the Warsaw regime as a price for aid in the east, a solution in which most Galicians refused to acquiesce. Nevertheless, Poland and the Soviet Union made peace, and shortly afterwards the remnants of the Ukrainian army and bureaucracy retreated across the border for internment in Poland. From this sanctuary a group of a few hundred under Colonel George Tiutiunnyk sortied in October, 1921, for a last desperate raid into the Soviet-occupied Ukraine.[22]

86 665 After that the East Ukraine lay under Communist rule, which could no longer be challenged by military force. For a time, however, it appeared as if the rising tide of nationalist sentiment—it rose even among those who had long been adherents of Marxist doctrines—might bring about what arms had failed to accomplish. To understand this situation it is necessary to recall that the Communists under Lenin had modified their original stand in order to appeal to the nationalism of the non-Russians. In January, 1918, soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Third Congress of Soviets asserted a theoretical right of all the nations of the tsarist empire to go their several ways, to secede from the Bolshevik government in Moscow. At the same time, it deprived this right of any content by insisting that it be exercised only by the "toiling masses." Although the Communist Party's stand was more ambiguously phrased, its insistence that the interests of the toilers were represented only by the Communist Party and that the non-Russian Communist Parties formed inseparable parts of the central Bolshevik organization, in fact rendered self-determination a fiction. During the following years, the central Party [661] leadership used armed force when possible to insure that these local Communist Parties, thus reduced to mere branches of a

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[22] Mazepa, III, 96–105.

668 time was allotted to the process of registering "popular approval" [661] for incorporation of the occupied lands in the Soviet Union. A "Ukrainian National Congress," "elected" immediately after the Soviet invasion, met on October 26; on November 1 the head of its plenary committee, M. I. Panchyshyn, sent a request for admission to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; on November 15, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet) of the latter division of the Soviet state approved the request; thus East and West Ukraine were "united."[59]

[626] In spite of the complete replacement of independent press and 648 political organizations by Communist agencies, however, a strong 167 effort was made in the early months to attract support for the new regime. Perhaps one reason for this attempt was the desire to influence Ukrainians still outside the enlarged Soviet Ukrainian Republic, especially in the Generalgouvernement. In a protocol to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which had defined the frontier between the parts of Poland annexed by the two totalitarian powers, it was provided that the government of the USSR should place no obstacles in the way of migration of ethnic Germans from eastern Poland to Germany. This secured for the Nazis the right to "bring home" the tens of thousands of German-speaking Volhynians. In return, Germany acknowledged an equal right of Belorussians and Ukrainians to migrate to the Soviet Union.[60] In accordance with a further provision of the protocol, a Soviet "repatriation" commission was allowed to travel through the Lemko region in early 1940;[61] by the end of June, it had induced only thirty-five hundred Ukrainians to cross the border into the Soviet Union, however.[62]

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[59] S. M. Belousov and O. P. Ohloblyn, *Zakhidna Ukraïna* (The West Ukraine) (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk URSR, Instytut Istoriï Ukraïny, 1940), pp. 108 ff.

[60] Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office,* eds. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington: Department of State, 1948), pp. 104–5.

[61] *Krakauer Zeitung,* February 18–19, 1940, p. 6, reports the departure of one thousand Ukrainians from this area after a visit of the Soviet commissioners.

167 [62] According to *Nastup,* June 29, 1940, pp. 2–3. In an article which was remarkably hostile to the Soviet regime, in view of the latter's publicly cordial relations with Germany at that time, the Nationalist paper stated that the "intensive propaganda" of the Soviet commission, aided by "the pro-Russian intelligentsia" but combatted by "healthy Ukrainian elements," had resulted in the meager migration

668* organizations, though agents were probably present.[70] The UNR, on the other hand, as will be described, was able to establish loose connections with a group which had been formed by nationalist youths in the remote Kostopol' (Kostopil')-Liudvipol' (Liudvypil') area near the former border between Polish and Soviet Volhynia.

626 668* [161] The situation in Bukovina prior to June, 1940, had in many respects closely paralleled that which existed in Galicia before September, 1939. The small Ukrainian population (about one quarter of a million persons) was subjected to a denationalizing policy by the Rumanian government, which included severe limitations on the use of Ukrainian in education and restriction of the press and of cultural activities. As in Galicia, there was a legal press and party, however, which endeavored to work within the scope permitted by the Rumanian authorities. There was also a fairly large section of the OUN, working underground. Corresponding —less closely—to Volhynia, was a considerable area of Ukrainian settlement in southern Bessarabia. This section of the Ukrainian ethnic group, however, was so backward culturally and so cut off geographically from contact with districts in which nationalism was strong that it appears to have played almost no role in the nationalist movements of the war period.

● 648 In June, 1940, while Germany was still occupied with the final phases of the French campaign, the Soviet Union began to press claims for territorial cessions from Rumania. It had long been recognized that Moscow would seize the first favorable moment to secure the retrocession of Bessarabia, the annexation of which by Rumania it had never recognized. Demands for Bukovina, however, apparently came as something of a shock to the German negotiators who were preparing a settlement of the Russian demands. They objected on the grounds that Bukovina had never been a part of the Russian Empire and that it contained a large

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[70] Mel'nyk adherents have since claimed that their organizers who had been in Volhynia for a considerable time were killed by Bandera followers shortly before or after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war; see Mykhailiuk, p. 88; O. Shuliak, *V im'ia pravdy: Do istoriï povstanoho rukhu v Ukraïni* (In the Name of Truth: On the History of the Insurrectionary Movement in the Ukraine) (Rotterdam, 1947), p. 10.

German colony. Molotov countered that it was the last "missing 648 ● piece" of the Ukraine, though he agreed to limit his demands to the northern, predominantly Ukrainian part and offered to permit the repatriation of the ethnic German minority.[80]

Germany was not ready for a break with the USSR; conse- 661 quently Rumania was forced to give way. On June 28, her forces evacuated Chernovtsy (Chernivtsi),[81] the Bukovinian capital, and the Red Army took over. The sequence of events was similar to that which had occurred nine months previously in L'vov, but the tempo was quicker. The leading newspaper, *Chas,* [204] was Sovietized and a new Communist organ, *Nova Rada,* founded, though a number of Ukrainian books forbidden under Rumanian rule were authorized.[82] The Ukrainian People's House and other national cultural societies were closed. At the same time, the Soviet press assailed the repressive measures which the Rumanians had taken against Ukrainian cultural life. Soviet writers were indignant at the difficulties experienced by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Chernovtsy, although they denounced the Petliurist elements among them.[83] Numerous leading Ukrainians were not allowed to enjoy their new "intellectual freedom," but were arrested or shot as nationalist "counterrevolutionaries." It is said, however, that the German consul and the commission for evacuating the ethnic Germans succeeded in taking out numerous Ukrainian political leaders and priests of the Orthodox Church.[84] In any case, many thousands of refugees, mostly young people, found their way to Germany, where a large proportion provided an invigorating element for the segment of the OUN which had remained under Mel'nyk.[85]

The subjection of the West Ukraine to Soviet rule brought death or imprisonment to a considerable number of prominent Ukrainians; the entire population was oppressed by a heavy authorities by its rapid development and by its hold on 000 the people. Some months before the declaration of war a monster trial took place at Marmaros-Sziget, in which the adherents of the russophile organizations were tried for high treason. Most of the accused were peasants, which confirms the success of Russian ideas among the popular masses. Many were condemned to long terms of imprisonment. Immediately after the beginning of the war arrests again took place among the same Russian circles. These measures led to another trial at the beginning of 1915, but this time the tribunal sat at Talerhof under martial law and pronounced several death sentences. The account of these repressions against the Russian circles of Galicia by the Austrian Government was brought back by Count Bobrinsky, who served as a liaison agent between the Russian organizations in Kiev and those of Galicia and who was a witness at the first trial.

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[80] Ambassador von der Schulenburg in Moscow to Auswärtiges Amt, June 26, 1940, *Nazi-Soviet Relations,* p. 159.

[81] Rumanian Cernăuți; German Chernowitz.

[82] *Nastup,* August 3, 1940, p. 3.

[83] "Besarabiia i pivnichna chastyna Bukovyny" (Bessarabia and the Northern Part of Bukovina), *Komunist,* June 30, 1940, p. 2; S. Zhurakovych and Ie. Patner, "Misto pod Prutom" (City on the Pruth), *Komunist,* July 5, 1940, p. 3.

[84] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* September 7, 1941, p. 3.

[85] See Chapter IV.

We have seen that the anti-Ukrainian police measures 648 taken by the Russian Government after the Polish 175 insurrection of 1863 were politically directed against the eventual possibility of Polish-Ukrainian collaboration, which was incidentally unrealizable. These measures did not bring about any political reaction in Russian Ukraine. They only brought the Ukrainian intellectual circles into evidence by their brutality and lack of justification. On the contrary they helped to crystallize the anti-Russian Ukrainian movement in Galicia, which found a loyal supporter in the Austro-Hungarian Government. The ideas developed in the plan of Prince Adam Czartoryski, despite their being out of tune with the whole history of the Ukrainian-Polish relations, were later adopted by certain Austrian circles which, as one knows, had become masters of Galicia after the last partition of Poland. Austria-Hungary

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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intended to put itself in the place of the Great Poland of other days and to create, under the sceptre of the Hapsburgs, a federation of Slavonic lands. In the immediate entourage of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne, the idea of transforming the Austro-Hungarian Empire into a federal State found great favour. The idea of taking advantage of the anti-Russian Ukrainianism of Galicia as a counterweight to Russian power and, at the same time, to Polish pretensions to cultural and political direction of the Ukrainian movement, was quite in tune with this plan. It was the intention of the Austrian politicians to use Ukrainian separatism as a means of creating difficulties behind the Russian front in case of war, and of securing some allies on the other side of the frontier.

In order to attract the sympathies of the Ukrainian intellectuals the Austro-Hungarian Government showed great tolerance towards the cultural institutions of the country, readily authorizing the creation of Ukrainian schools and putting no obstacles in the way of the development of political societies and institutions which, as we have already said, also served to eclipse the Polish influence over the leading circles of Galicia. The Austrian Government did not only authorize the creation of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine,' but gave effective assistance to its development in granting it the means of action, which it did not grant to the political organizations of the other Slavonic minorities. Skoropis-Ioltoukhovsky, Jouk, Dorochenko, and Salisniak, all convinced separatists and extreme anti-Russians, were placed at the head of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine.' The Russian general staff became alarmed by this movement, whose principal aim it suspected—the disorganization, in case of war, of the foundations of the army which would be formed in the south of Russia. Later on, in 1917, the bulletin which 648 was published at Stockholm by the members of the 175 'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine' confirmed the justified anxiety of the Russian military authorities. This bulletin declared that the 'Union' had taken up a clear-cut position in all that concerned the relations with Russia, in basing all her hopes on the military defeat of the latter. It hoped for the occupation of the Ukraine by the troops of the countries at war with Russia, in order to attain a national independence with the aid of the central empires. Thanks to the great ability of her propagandists and to the continual support of the Austrian Government, the 'Union' was able to obtain considerable financial assistance consisting, apart from the contributions of the Galician and Bucovinian peasants and the Ukrainian colonists in America, of the grant of the 'Friends of Ukrainian Independence,' who belonged to those nationalities who were prepared to go to war with Russia. The accounts of the financial organization of the 'Union' were brought, in 1917, to the Russian military authorities by one of its former collaborators. One can say without exaggeration that the initiative and the elaboration of the programme of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' can be traced to Austria, which proposed, in case of an offensive in Russian-Ukrainian territory, that the members of this organization should follow her army with the aim of finding supporters of separatism among the native population of Russian Ukraine, and on the other hand for creating the new administration in the conquered country. But the Austrian advance did not take place. The Russian troops invaded Galicia and the most active members of the 'Union' had to take refuge in Vienna. Many of their number simply entered the Austrian secret service after this failure. That which remained of the 'Union'

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continued to receive subsidies from the Austrian Government and engaged in cultural work and autonomous propaganda among the Russian prisoners of Ukrainian nationality.

This propaganda began immediately after the Austrian defeat in Galicia in 1914. Special camps were organized in which Galician instructors tried to subject the Ukrainian peasants to their influence and to the idea of Ukrainian autonomy. The conditions under which these prisoners lived were better than those of Russian soldiers from other parts of Russia. But soon, owing to her continual military and political defeats, Austria began more and more to make way for Germany, who finally took over the affairs of the 'Union.'

The idea of a confederation of vassal States carved out of the Russian territory developed in Germany in certain intellectual and political circles since the end of the era of Bismarck. The decisive role in the development of these ideas was played by Baltic Germans originating from the Russian Baltic provinces, whose influence, at first purely cultural, became progressively stronger in the Reich.

000 The short-sighted policy of crude and superficial russification, inaugurated in the Baltic provinces in the reign of Alexander III, had exasperated a part of the Baltic nobility and especially of the intellectuals. Their national pride, encouraged by the great rise of Germany in 1870–1, was deeply offended by the policy of russification. Thus these barons and these intellectuals began to turn more and more towards the Reich. Some of them even tried to find a new home in the at last united Reich. They took with them a hate of Russian politics, their contempt of all the native peoples of Eastern Europe and their historical traditions, full of reminiscences of those struggles which the Teutonic order

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175 642 668 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local municipal or other organization took the slightest note of its existence. Every department, every district, and every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

648 727 The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

its members, especially of Petlioura, decided to send its 648
representatives to Brest-Litovsk to conclude a peace 727
with the central empires. This idea met with the sympathy of the Austro-German authorities whose negotiations for a peace with the Soviet Government had already lasted a long time.

The peace which was dictated by the German general staff was signed by the Rada. As compensation for the efforts of the central empires, who promised to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism, the Rada accepted German occupation and agreed to supply 1,000,000 tons of grain of which Germany and Austria had immediate need. Under the threat of German bayonets the representatives of Lenin also had to recognize the independence of the Ukraine. Already the Austro-German troops were making their entry into Ukrainian territory while meeting with only a feeble resistance of the armed units of the local Soviet governments and the remnants of the fleeing Imperial Army.

The only aim of the Austro-German military command was to obtain the stores of grain and of other food products which they hoped to find in abundance in the Ukraine. Yet, for political reasons, the Governments 727
of the central empires decided to support the fiction of Ukrainian independence under their protection. The entry of the troops was followed by the proclamation composed more or less in these terms : 'At the request of your Rada we have decided to enter your country in order to protect you from Bolshevik anarchy and to give you the possibility of developing in complete alliance with our two empires.'

One can say that no citizen took this declaration seriously and that the occupation was considered as an invasion by enemy troops. The Ukrainian Government 642
was established at Kiev[1] and was composed of three 727

[1] [i.e. in 1919 --- Analyst]

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642 727 political groups : the separatists of the right, the national democrats, and the federalist social democrats. Thus, as these names show, the Ukrainian Government formed by the Austro-Germans was not homogeneous in the matter of its partisanship of independence.

727 The Austro-Germans did not take this farce of political independence any more seriously than did the population. Their attitude was simply that of conquerors. 'For every German soldier killed, ten *Russian* soldiers, chosen among the population of the district where the crime has been committed, will be immediately shot,' the terrified inhabitants of Kremenetz (town of Volynia) (Order No. 2, town of Kremenetz, 28 February 1918) read on the posters signed by the commandant of the Austrian division a few days after the proclamation of official friendship. The 'friendly country' closely resembled a colonial conquest. The general staff of the army of General Eichhorn reported to the commander of the eastern front on 4 May 1918: 'The Austro-German troops would have no difficulty in maintaining order and public tranquillity from the moment we renounce the fiction of a friendly country. We are still obliged to obtain the permission of the Ukrainian commissioners, who are confused and irritated, for some of our actions.'

648 Meanwhile two points of view existed in Austro-German circles concerning the subject of the independence of the Ukraine. The army considered the Ukraine a conquered enemy country which had to furnish, with the least possible delay, agricultural produce in accordance with the terms of peace.

On the other hand diplomatic circles saw in the independence, fictitious though it was, the future of German diplomacy, based on the partition of the succession of the dismembered Russian Empire. Parallel to thus, rivalry began between Austria-Hungary and Germany concerning the question of the predominance of one or the other in the direction of Ukrainian policy. The resentment of Austria, outstripped by Germany in the political and military spheres, has allowed us to have, to-day, possession of genuine documents which reveal the point of view of the central empires on the organization of the Ukrainian State and of its principal leaders.

Disappointed by the lack of success of the policy of its Government, the general staff of Austria-Hungary reported, on 16 April 1918, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna the characteristics of the principal Ukrainian statesmen, whose subjection to Germany caused alarm :

' Holoubovitch—Premier—a fanciful theorist, eloquent but without character, appointed by the Germans.

' Lioubinsky—Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—a clean-shaven young man, well versed in Socialist and revolutionary theories. Entirely in the hands of the Germans.

' Joukovski—Minister of War—in my opinion russophile, former Colonel of the Russian General Staff, does all he can to appear a hundredper cent Socialist-revolutionary to his colleagues. Effectively a " German puppet."

' Khristiouk—Secretary-General of the Rada—an intelligent young man, outwardly very smart, apart from that of German sympathies.

' Hrouchevsky—President of the Rada—an old man in the grip of fear and of tremblings, whose decayed old body is intended to give the Rada the noble rust of an honoured senate. He anxiously clings to the German authorities and expresses no sympathy for Austria.'

Despite the cynicism of this document, one must admit that its author, General Waldstatten, did not lack humour or intelligence.

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148 The Minister of the Reich at Kiev, Muhm, a subtler man, expressed himself differently though in the same sense: 'I am convinced that it is necessary to maintain the fiction of a friendly independent country in the Ukraine. . . . We shall completely destroy the little authority which remains with the Ukrainian Government if we were to show too coarsely that it is only a toy in our hands.'

191 Disarmed, enslaved by the great force of the army of
177 the central empires, the Ukraine[2] was not in the position of an independent State. The Ukrainian language, imported from Galicia, was not spoken in the country. Only official documents and administrative notices were written in Ukrainian. Not a single private business ever used this language either for correspondence or advertising. In the schools and universities Russian continued to be used. The circulation of newspapers in the Ukrainian language was very small, while the Russian papers which agreed not to carry on open propaganda against the troops of occupation appeared everywhere and were actually the only ones read by the population.

727 The Ukrainian Government, composed of politicians
642 having absolutely no administrative experience, soon proved to be incapable of organizing the supply of grain as promised to the armies of the central empires. The Germans then decided to change the regime. The organizations of landowners, small and big, which supplied corn and other agricultural produce to the forces of occupation, were favoured by the Austro-German authorities. It is unnecessary to point out that no Ukrainian political idea influenced the creation of these organizations. The Germans selected their association, known under the name of '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*,[1]

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[1] '*Khliborobiv*' means farmers in Ukrainian. '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*' means association of farmers.

[2] [i.e. in 1919. --- Analyst]

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645 my control and under that of the German general staff.'

An amusing, but true, story described the political position of the Ministers of the Government of the Hetman. The anecdote concerns the General Ragoza, the War Minister, whose sympathies were in no way Ukrainian. In October 1918 the Russian newspaper *Goloss Kieva* published a so-called order of the day of General Denikine, Commander-in-Chief of the White Army, declaring himself supreme chief of the armed forces on Ukrainian territory. His representative Colonel B., adorning himself with the uniform of the Imperial Army, presented himself without the slightest regard for etiquette to General Ragoza to inform him of the order of General Denikine and requested that the War Minister of the Ukraine would put himself at his disposal. The Minister was so taken aback that he began to assure the envoy of his loyalty to Russia and hastily gave his signature to prove his sincerity. The Russian officers living in Kiev took advantage of this incident to appear in the streets in their most brilliant uniforms of the old Russian Army and invited the population to decorate the city with the Imperial colours. It is unnecessary to say that the order was enthusiastically received by the population. The joke is that it was only a trick played by a Russian newspaper in Kiev, as this order of General Denikine had never existed.

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The personality of the Hetman himself was also not very reassuring to the idea of Ukrainian independence. Here are the informations which were sent to Kiev on 30 May 1918 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich: 'In June 1914 Skoropadsky presented an *aide-mémoire* to the Imperial Government in which he denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, identifying them with the Russian people.' 'The whole Ukrainian

movement is only the product of Austrian intrigues,' 648
he explained in this document. In July 1917, we are 142
also informed by this document, Skoropadsky published an open letter in which he called Kiev 'the centre of *Russian* culture,' and concluded that it would be necessary to take the initiative to 'unify all the *Russian* lands in a federal organism.'

All these testimonies show the illusory independence of the Ukraine under German occupation.[1] It is easy to understand that the Russian reactionary circles in the first place, and even other more moderate circles, should have considered the establishment of the Government of the Hetman, whose separatist convictions were more than doubtful, a happy event. The superficial Ukrainization, which continued more or less effectively under the fictitious power of the Rada, ceased almost completely under the Hetman. Only the official journal and some insignificant leaflets continued to be published in Ukrainian. Russian again became if not the official at least the semi-official language and the only one actually used in the administrative offices. The Russian circles considered the Government of the Hetman a provisional one which, supported by the Austro-German military forces and entrenched behind the fiction of an independent Ukraine, was able to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism. In their eyes the Government of the Ukraine was only a political and economic base for the future anti-Bolshevik movement in the whole Russian territory, able to serve as a springboard to the White

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[1] All the documents which we quote here are contained in the book that appeared in Moscow in 1936 under the name of *The Failure of the German Occupation of the Ukraine*, a book which contains the secret correspondence of the Austro-German authorities in the Ukraine with their respective Governments. The Soviets of the soldiers of the Austro-German units in flight transmitted these documents of enormous value to the Soviet Government.

648 Army which was being organized in the territory of the
[642] Don Cossacks and in the Northern Caucasus. They were not far wrong. The Government of the 'Independent Ukraine,' considered to be anti-Russian, supplied the Volunteer Army,[1] on whose standards the device 'the one and indivisible Russia' was inscribed, with arms and ammunition. Entire trains proceeded to Rostov-on-Don, transporting officers, cadets, and civilians wishing to serve in the Volunteer Army. Even at Kiev the White military organization enjoyed a certain amount of liberty. A tacit collaboration developed under the half-sympathetic eyes of the central empires, between the command of the White Army and the Ukrainian Government of Kiev. This tolerance on the part of the Austro-Germans found its explanation in the imminence of their defeat on the western front. Thus Ukrainian politics and especially the support of Bolshevism which they considered an involuntary ally, having ranged Russia among the neutrals, no longer had any sense. The Austro-German authorities began to take an interest in the opponents of Communism and of Ukrainianism and even looked to the Don Cossacks with a view to collaboration, those same Cossacks who, though well organized since the October Revolution as an independent State, had never expressed the desire of separating from the Russian Empire.

642 The internal policy of the new Government, com-
727 pletely at the service of the forces of occupation, was
423 characterized by the support of private property and particularly of the landowners. This policy led to the proclamation of new laws regarding the return of estates to the landowners, of which they had been deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles of 1917.

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[1] The name which was officially used by the White Army which, at the beginning, did not resort to any mobilization and only filled its ranks with volunteers.

727 by the troops of Petlioura. On their part the Soviet
authorities took their vengeance in the towns and the
country districts on hostages, in proceeding with mass
executions of members of the middle classes, intellectuals,
rich peasants, and clergy, while the Whites inaugurated
the mass hanging of Communist leaders. The interval
of the French occupation of Odessa, in April 1919,
669 changed nothing in the situation. The second counter-
727 offensive of the Soviets, followed by still more atrocious
massacres, ended in putting the whole Ukraine under
Soviet domination at the end of the winter of 1920.
The Whites, under the command of General Wrangel,
entrenched themselves on the Crimean peninsula. The
troops of Petlioura were again driven back towards
Poland. From this moment a new phase of the Civil
War begins in the Ukraine. Guerrilla fighting, led by
chiefs of Ukrainian bands such as Makhno, Kosak, and
others, known under the name of the *bat'ki* (the fathers),
began. They had important forces at their disposal.
Under the cover of political ideologies (Makhno was
anarchist, the others 'Communists without Jews,' etc.)
they devastated the rear of the Soviet front. The
personnel of these bands was undoubtedly of peasant
extraction. They were mostly the remnants of the
Army of Petlioura which had succeeded, after his defeat,
in filtering to the rear of the Soviet front. Until a long
time after the establishment of the Soviet regime, these
bands menaced the communications and disorganized
the life of the country. Full-scale military operations
would have been required to deal with the *bat'ki*. The
Ukraine did not easily submit to Bolshevism.

648 In 1920 a last attempt of foreign intervention in Ukrainian affairs was undertaken by Marshal Pilsudski.

The defeat of the Central Powers led to the unchaining of the eternal struggle between the Ukrainians and the

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Poles. First the Galician question was raised immediately 648 ●
after the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy (in October
1918). Following the example of all the nationalities
which had been a part of it, the Ukrainians of Galicia [642]
formed a national council at Lvov, which proclaimed the
independence of the Western Ukrainian Republic. After
the fall of Skoropadsky this new republic was eager to
unite with the Directorate of Petlioura. The Act of
Union was proclaimed in January 1919. But the Poles
did not think on the same lines. During the same 726
January 1919, Poles and Ukrainians already fought 648
each other furiously in the streets of Lvov. The arrival
of the Polish troops of General Haller, formed in
France, quickly turned the tide. A regular army of
80,000 men represented a very important force in
Eastern Europe where, from the Carpathians to the
Pacific, an immense territory was plunged into anarchy.
For General Haller there was no question of a Western
Ukrainian Republic, but only one of a Little Poland, a
simple province of the reborn Great Poland. As we
had already seen, the detachments of the Polish Army
of Haller threw themselves, in April of the same year,
against the vanguards of the Red Army. Recently
restored, the Polish State already claimed the frontiers
applying before the first partition, that is to say the
annexation of White Russia and the Ukraine up to the
Dnieper. While the Petliourians, the Reds, and the
Whites faced each other on both sides of the Dnieper,
the Poles seized the greater part of Volynia and of
White Russia and entered Minsk. But the Poles did not
seem to exploit their success, most probably in order
to give the Red Army the chance to destroy the White
Army which, in case of victory, might transform itself
into a national Russian Army, dangerous from the
point of the territorial pretensions of Great Poland.

648 While awaiting further developments, Poland occupied herself with the Ukraine.

While the Polish sympathies of Petlioura became more precise, an important, if not the best, part of his troops, recruited among the Galicians of the former Austrian regiments, united, in November 1919, with the Russian Volunteer Army. Later the Galician Army was involved in the general collapse of the Whites. But it had tried the only chance of rescuing the Western Ukraine from Polish domination. Petlioura, safe behind Polish bayonets, appeared as an instrument completely in the service of the new Poland and of her chief, Marshal Pilsudski.

728 648 In December 1919 the representative of Petlioura signed, in the name of the Ukraine, a first declaration which recognized the Polish sovereignty over Galicia, Podolia, and Volynia, a declaration which, on 21 April 1920, was supplemented by a secret treaty of alliance according to the terms of which the popular Ukrainian Republic confirmed the cession to the complete sovereignty of Poland of these lands, in all more than 150,000 square kilometres with almost six million inhabitants, in return for the recognition of Petlioura by Poland as chief of the Ukrainian Government. Poland promised, amongst other things, to support the creation of a Ukrainian State, which had become very small and only included a very narrow territory between the new Polish frontier, very advanced to the east, and the old Polish-Russian frontier of the time before the first partition. This secret treaty was supplemented by a military agreement, which was signed three days later. Its terms guaranteed the formation of allied Ukrainian units, which would be under Polish command, in the territory ceded to the Poles. The railways of the Ukrainian territory were to be entirely at the disposal

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of the Polish troops. No more than the secret convention did the military treaty foresee Polish help, except in the Ukraine on the right bank, which alone interested the Poles. The authors of these agreements were so well aware of the incompatibility of this treaty with the national sentiments of the Ukrainian people that they never dared to publish these acts. Even the members of the Directorate, apart from a few exceptions, were not informed of it. It is only in 1926 that this document was published by Professor S. Cheloukhine, a Ukrainian monarchist and former President of the Law Tribunal of Odessa under the Tsars. 728 648

After the signature of the military treaty on 7 May 1920 the Polish troops, followed by Petlioura, entered Kiev. The Polish domination over a large part of the Ukraine seemed re-established. But soon the divisions of the Red Cavalry, commanded by Boudenny,[1] marched towards the east and the Ukrainian peasants, despite their dislike of the Soviet regime, supported them with all means. The former Commander-in-Chief of the south-western front at the time of the Tsar, General Broussilov, proclaimed a national war against Poland and published an appeal to which, raised by a wave of patriotism, many thousands of Tsarist officers replied, though they would never have, till then, agreed to serve in the Soviet Army. We will be unable to study the details of the Russo-Polish War which saw Poland escape from disaster at the decisive battle under the walls of Warsaw.

After the defeat of Warsaw, Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Riga in 1921 and abandoned to Poland that Ukrainian territory which had been ceded to her by Petlioura—Eastern Galicia, Western Volynia, and Polesia. There can be no doubt that only the Soviet 728

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[1] Former Cavalry Adjutant, to-day Marshal of the Soviet Union and Commander-in-Chief of the Moscow Military district.

728 Government, hostile in principle to everything connected with Russian national tradition, could put its signature on such a document, considered as an even greater national humiliation than the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Ukrainian separatist movement, doubly compromised by its agreements with the central empires and with Poland, foundered as a result of general contempt.

● 648 728 Soon the Allied Powers recognized the Polish domination over the whole of Galicia, at first as a temporary measure. It became definite on 15 March 1923. Poland agreed to establish an autonomous regime here, but this promise had never been honoured. From this date, too, Poland exercised her absolute power over a considerable part of the Ukrainian people.

000 The Soviet attitude to the Ukrainian question at that time is not of great interest and does not furnish new factors which could throw new light on the problem.

If Soviet policy with regard to this problem seems confused and inconsequent, this is so because it is not determined by a firm and well-established point of view, but by two factors which are outside this question: by the reaction of the Ukrainian population to the 'social experience' to which it is subjected and by the attitude of Germany and Poland to the Ukrainian problem.

642 Immediately after the establishment of Soviet rule on Ukrainian territory, and in full agreement with Marxist theories, the right of peoples to determine their own fate was proclaimed and naturally also affected the Ukraine, as every other member of the Soviet Union. Thus the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine was founded. The Constitution even gave it the official right of ceding from the U.S.S.R. This is the official aspect. In practice the Ukraine became an integral part of the Soviet Union and completely dependent on the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

661 Oppositionists of the party the opportunity of releasing a veritable ‘ Petliourization ’ of the peasant class and of the small town-dwellers, aiming at the separation of the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.

648 Since 1936, as a reaction to the policy of the Reich, which tended to unite the different Ukrainian movements under its guidance, the Soviet Government adopted a new Ukrainian policy the official thesis of which was the *brotherly union of the Ukrainian and Great Russian people, as bequeathed by history.*

197 To-day we observe an attempt at bringing the Ukrainian and Russian languages closer together. Ukrainian is being purged of its Polonisms and its Germanisms, imported from Galicia, which ‘ the enemies of the people ’ had tried to implant in the Soviet Ukraine. A system which tends to awaken and to maintain Russian national pride has been inaugurated. The victory of Poltava is no longer the victory of a Tsar who oppressed his people, but the liberation of the Ukrainian workers from the Swedish and Polish aggressors.

000 To sum up, among all the countries subjected to the ‘ social experiments ’ by the heirs of Lenin, the Ukraine bows to them with far greater difficulty than the others. In this she seems to be the obvious prey of separatism, led by foreigners, the declared enemies of her people.

The Soviet Government is alone responsible for the existence of this separatism, which cannot be justified from any point of view and is foreign to the spirit and the interests of the Ukrainian people.

175 people deteriorated also in consequence of the religious persecutions of Ukrainians by the Polish State. For these reasons, in 1648 the great Ukrainian revolution against Poland broke out under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—1657), the Hetman of the Cossack Army.

[642] 175 648 In consequence of the revolution of 1648 the Ukrainian Cossack Republic was created headed by an elected Chief of State (Hetman). The official name of this State was 'Zaporovian Army' (Exercitus Zaporoviensis) with Tchyhyryn as Capital. Leaning upon the Cossacks and the free peasantry, the Ukrainian Republic could defend itself against the united forces of Poland and the Crimean Horde for several years. Having lost the hope for a settlement with Poland on the principle of equality, the Ukrainian Government concluded a treaty with the Muscovite Tsar in Pereyaslav, in 1654. The Muscovite Tsar promised the Ukrainians assistance against Poland and the Tartars. The treaty of Pereyaslav secured for Ukraine its own army, administration, and an independent foreign policy.

The transition of Ukraine towards Moscow in the 17th century provided the basis for the rise of the Muscovite state. The Ukrainian revolution of 1648 weakened Poland considerably.

Under the protectorate of the Tsar of Moscow Ukraine did not find security for its liberty, prosperity and progress. The Swedish King Charles X. Gustav understood this well when he wrote to his Ambassador to the Ukrainian Government, in 1657: "Moscow does not tolerate a free nation"*). When it had become evident that the Tsar of Moscow tried to reduce or to abolish the rights of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Government of B. Khmelnitsky planned the annulment of the alliance with Moscow, and concluded treaties with Sweden and Transylvania to secure the independence of Ukraine (1656 and 1657). The Ukrainian Government put forward the demand for the frontiers of the Ukrainian State as '*ius totius Ukrainae antiquae vel Roxolaniae*' up to the Vistula, the Ukrainian ethnographic frontier of that time. In the treaty with Sweden of 1657, Ukraine was recognised as a free nation dependent on no one *('gens libera, nulli subiecta').*

Against the Ukrainian aspirations for independence Poland and Moscow acted in common. By the treaty of Andrusov of 1667, Ukraine was divided among these countries on the Dnieper line. Turkey and the Crimean Horde interfered with the struggle in Ukraine. In these wars, lasting nearly 30 years, Ukraine on the western bank of the Dnieper River was disastrously devastated. In

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*) ***Archives of South-West Russia*, Part III, Vol. VI: Kiev 1908.**

a treaty between Turkey, Moscow, and Poland of 1681, it was 175
determined to depopulate Ukraine between the South Bug and 648
Dnieper Rivers to the Black Sea. The western Ukrainian territories (Volhynia, Galicia etc.) remained under Polish rule. Ukraine to the East of the Dnieper remained under the protectorate of the Muscovite Tsars, preserving restricted autonomous rights, with an elected Hetman as the head of the Government.

Tsar Peter I. planned the abolition of the remains of the autonomous order of Ukraine on the Eastern bank of the Dnieper. In order to defend the freedom of Ukraine, Hetman Ivan Mazeppa concluded an alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII. against Russia in 1708. The battle of Poltava (1709), fatal for Ukraine and Sweden, put an end to the plans of the Ukrainian patriots to restore Ukrainian independence. Nonetheless, for decades even in the second half of the 18th century, the members of the Ukrainian Government which went into exile in 1709, continued in various countries their diplomatic action for the defence of the Ukrainian independence. They were headed by Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, the successor of Mazeppa, and included the son of Hetman Orlyk, Hryhor Orlyk, General in the French service, Fedir Myrovych and others.

After the battle of Poltava the Russian Government restricted [661]
the autonomous rights of Ukraine considerably. Tsar Peter I. 175
deliberately destroyed Ukraine in order to oppress her people the more easily, as we are informed by Weber, the Resident of Brunswick-Hannover in Moscow, a contemporary of Tsar Peter I.*). Ukraine was forced to pay heavy contributions, Ukrainians were sent in masses to the North to build Petersburg, the new capital of the Tsars. Many thousands of Ukrainians died from exhaustion while working for the strengthening of Russian Tsarist despotism. At the same time Moscow took from Ukraine its best cultural workers — scholars, artists, artisans. Western civilisation was introduced to Russia principally by Ukrainian intellectuals. (See K. Kharlampovich, *Little Russian Influence on the Great Russian Ecclesiastical Life:* Kazan, 1912; and Pekarsky, *Science and Literature in the Time of Peter* — I — II).

The Tsarina Catherine II. abolished the autonomous Ukrainian Government in 1764. Ukraine was brought to the level of the other provinces of the Tsarist Empire.

The Russian Government decided also to destroy the Zaporovian Army, the nest of democratic liberty in Ukraine. In 1775, Russian

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*) Weber, Das veränderte Rußland: Hannover 1729.

175 troops conquered the fortress of the Ukrainian Cossacks — the Zaporovian Sich. The remainder of the Zaporovian Cossacks migrated to the Turkish province at the mouth of the Danube, and founded there a new centre under the protectorate of the Sultan. The lands of the Zaporovian Army, that had been defended against the Tartar hordes in a fierce struggle lasting for hundreds of years, the Russian Government granted to its magnates, first of all to favourites of Catherine II.

175 648 The Western Ukrainian territories, which, by the Polish-Muscovite treaty of 1667, had remained in the Polish State after the dismemberment of Poland at the end of the 18th century, were incorporated partly by Russia and partly by Austria (Galicia 1772). Bukovina too, which had formerly belonged to Turkey, became a province of Austria in 1774. Carpatho-Ukraine had belonged to Hungary since the Middle Ages (cities Užhorod-Ungvar, Mukačevo-Munkacs).

181 175 [566] The struggle of the Ukrainians for independence under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—57) had abolished serfdom in the greater part of Ukraine. It was the ideal of the masses of the Ukrainian people to live free, independent like the free Ukrainian Cossacks. After the abolition of the autonomous rights of Ukraine at the end of the 18th century serfdom for the Ukrainian peasants was introduced in Ukraine in the Muscovite way. But against this oppression the masses of the Ukrainian people rose often in revolt.

Historical evolution has developed in the Ukrainian people an aspiration for freedom and defence of human dignity. Voltaire wrote in his *History of Charles XII.:* "L'Ukraine a toujours aspiré à être libre" (Ukraine has always aspired to be free). "This is a nation that wants freedom," wrote the prominent Ukrainian writer of the 17th century, the Archbishop of Chernigov, Lazar Baranovych, to the Muscovite Tsar Alexey Mikhaylovich.

The conviction prevailed among the Ukrainians that Ukraine was not dependent on Russia but was only associated in the person of the Monarch. In the political dialogue *Dispute of Little Russia with Great Russia* at the end of the 18th century we read the following words of 'Little Russia' addressing 'Great Russia': "Do not think thou art my lord, but thine and mine sovereign is our common master."

175 648 The Ukrainian patriots could not forget the loss of liberty and independence, and looked for understanding of the Ukrainian case to foreign countries. In 1793 the well known Ukrainian patriot Vasyl Kapnist tried to persuade the Prussian Minister Hertzberg

that it was in the interest of Prussia to help the Ukrainian people 175
to cast off the chains of Muscovite slavery. During the Great French 648
Revolution the person of Napoleon was very popular in Ukraine. Ukrainian patriots were pleased by the victories of the French Emperor, and hoped that, after the defeat of Russia in a war with France, the time for the liberation of Ukraine would come, and the odious serfdom would be abolished. But Napoleon had no understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He planned the creation of two states 'Napoléonides' in Ukraine under his protectorate . . .*)

Ukrainian history has gone its own way, different from that of Russia. This has created the peculiar national character of the Ukrainians.

The foreigners who had visited Ukraine in the 17th and 18th 175
centuries pointed out the higher level of civilisation among the 181
Ukrainians in comparison with the Russians, and the highly developed 517
feeling of personal dignity of the Ukrainian people. This love of freedom of the Ukrainian people appeared also in the fight against Tsarist absolutism in Russia, where revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin occupied the first places, Zhelyabov, Kybalchych, Konashevych, Osynsky, Kravchynsky (Stepnyak), Popko, and many other members of the party '*Narodnaya Volya*'.

In the 19th century, under the influence of the ideas of that time (the Great French Revolution, romanticism) the regeneration of the so-called unhistorical pepoples (Serbians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Baltic peoples) began; in the beginning it was the interest for the language and history of the peoples among the educated classes, and the attempt to write in the 'common people's' language.
In Ukraine the regeneration of the popular literary language began [538]
with the publication of the satirical poem of Ivan Kotlyarevsky *Aeneid:* 1798. In this poem the author underlines his dislike of serfdom and the lords

"who did not give the people freedom
and treated them like cattle."

Democratic ideas were widespread in Ukraine; the representatives 175
of the Ukrainian educated classes took an active part in the 186
revolutionary organisations directed towards the fall of the Tsarist régime (the uprising of the 'Decabrists', 1825—26, was most active in Ukraine, near Kiev).

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organisation, *The Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius,* was founded in Kiev. Many prominent representatives of Ukrainian culture like Taras Shevchenko (the

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*) *Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes:* Paris 1922.

148 order to secure the country, the Ukrainian Government began to concentrate in Ukraine the troops that had been separated from the Russian Army. The Ukrainian Government was against a separate peace with the Central Powers, as it was afraid to come under the influence of these nations. Thus in the session of the Ukrainian Central Council on December 25, 1917, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Choulguine, declared:

"The Bolsheviks are preparing to conclude a separate peace. We do not agree with this, we cannot permit that the Germans and Austrians move their regiments against the French and British. We stand for a general peace that would be welcomed by the democracy of the whole world".

[165] Against this policy of the Ukrainian Government the Russian Communist Party acted with demagogic propaganda.

On January 13, 1918, the newspaper of the Russian Communist Party in Kiev *The Proletarian Thought* wrote:

"The Central Council tries to destroy the struggle for peace... The Council is working in this direction by order of the 'allied' imperialists. The workers, soldiers and peasants of Ukraine and Russia know and remember well that, in their struggle for the immediate ending of the slaughter, the Central Council is their determined enemy and a faithful servant of the sharks of capital and of international robbers...".

5. *Great Britain and France Recognise Democratic Ukraine*

The position of the Ukrainian Government in the question of peace attracted the attention of Great Britain and France. At the beginning of December 1917, General Tabouis entered into relations with the Ukrainian Government as Commissioner of the French Republic to the Ukrainian Government. On January 11, 1918, General Tabouis handed to the Ukrainian Government the following declaration:

"Wishing to confirm its friendly intentions towards the Ukrainan Republic, the Government of the French Republic informed me by telegraph, the only present means of communication, that it appointed me as Representative of the French Republic to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic. It will soon be a year that I have been on the territory of Ukraine. In this time I had the opportunity to study the history of Ukraine, I watched with attention the development of its national movement, and I could observe the efforts the Ukrainian Republic had made in order to create and to strengthen the moral and physical forces necessary for the organisation of the state. I have watched all this with interest that grew steadily and I am happy and proud, President, to 648 see that to-day this interest is notonly personal, for, appointing me as its Representative, the Government of the French Republic approves my efforts and charges me to continue officially the excellent relations that have developed between us. I bring you the official assurance that France, which as the first country is undertaking this decisive step, will support with all her power the Ukrainian Republic in those endeavours she will undertake to continue to walk on that road the Allies had chosen, and on which they will march without hesitation, thoroughly conscious of their rigths and their duties towards the democracy of the whole world and of humanity ... From this day forward France has entered into official relations with Ukraine".

The Government of Great Britain appointed likewise its representative to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic, Sir Picton Bagge. In his letter to the Ukrainian Government Sir Picton wrote:

"My Government has charged me to assure you of its best intentions. It will support with all its strength the Ukrainian Government in the task it will undertake in creating an efficient administration, securing order and fighting the Central Powers".

6. The War of Soviet Russia against Ukraine

In December 1917, the Russian Bolshevik organisations in Ukraine, 669 leaning on the Russian armed forces stationed in the Ukrainian cities, tried to overthrow the Government of the Ukrainian Central Council and to set up the dictatorship of the Communist Party. The Ukrainian Government disarmed the Russian armed forces and sent them over the boundaries of Ukraine. After this the Soviet Russian Government put to the Ukrainian Government an ultimatum to stop in Ukraine the disarming of Russian troops, which were friendly to Communist dictatorship, and to return the arms to the troops already disarmed.

"If after 48 hours no satisfactory reply will be given, the Council of the People's Commissars will consider the Ukrainian Central Council to be at war with the Government of the Soviets in Russia and Ukraine", so ended the ultimatum of the Russian Communist Government.

For fighting the Ukrainian Democratic Republic the Russian Soviet Government created its puppet 'Government of Soviet Ukraine'. This 'government' took up its residence in Kharkov, captured by troops sent from Russia. The Kharkov 'Ukrainian

669 Ukraine. The 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' headed by Rakovsky left Ukraine and was abolished by order of Lenin. This was a new proof of the complete failure of the Russian Communist policy in Ukraine.

But at the same time the Ukrainian Republic met a new enemy who had claims on Ukraine. This was the Russian Volunteer Army under Denikin. The leaders of this army regarded the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as more dangerous for themselves than the Soviet dictatorship in Moscow. Therefore, in its struggle against the Russian 'Red Army', the Russian 'White Army' attempted before all to take possession of the Ukrainian territory in order to [648] prevent the strengthening of 'Ukrainian separatism'. In vain the Ukrainian Government appealed to the Western Great Powers that they should not admit the attack by the Russian Volunteer Forces on the Ukrainian Army and that they recognise the Government of democratic Ukraine. If in 1919 the Government and Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been given the least support by the Western Powers, the development of Eastern Europe and even the whole world would have taken another course than happened in fact. In any case, by securing an independent Ukraine, Russian imperialism would not be such a menace to the world as we see it to-day.

[731] When Denikin's troops met the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Kiev they attacked Ukrainian armed forces weakened by the struggle with the Russian Red Army and decimated by a disastrous typhus epidemic. This epidemic had spread principally in consequence of the blockade of the territory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army had no medicaments, no clothing nor sanitary equipment, the Ukrainian soldiers died in thousands, and there was no help. From the army the epidemic spread among the population of Ukraine.

[721] But even under these incredibly hard conditions the Army of the Ukrainian Republic and the masses of Ukrainian people did not abandon the fight against the new oppressors — the Russian Volunteers — who had abundant support from the Entente Powers. The Russian 'Whites' forbade the Ukrainian language in schools, offices and the press in the Ukrainian territory they had seized. Russian authorities ordered the burning of Ukrainian books. The Denikin Government cruelly persecuted Ukrainian patriots. Even the word 'Ukraine' was forbidden; the expression 'Little Russia' was used instead. The Denikin Government restored the estates of the big landowners in Ukraine.

Against the Denikin régime in Ukraine extensive risings of the

the Ukrainian partisan movement. New requisitions of grain and 669
the taking of arms from the population caused an even greater 661
disappointment among the Ukrainians. The partisan movement which had overthrown Denikin's power turned with new vigour against the Russian Communists. These risings were carried on under the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of arms and supplies did not permit the Ukrainian partisan movement to develop and to attain decisive results in the struggle with the overwhelming forces of the Russian Red Army.

17. Poland — Ukraine — Russia 1920—21

At the end of 1919, the regular front of the Ukrainian Army 648
broke down. The Ukrainian Army continued the fight against 669
'White' and 'Red' Russia as guerilla war. The diplomatic Mission 728
of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic headed by Andriy Liwycky, Cabinet member, started negotiations with the Polish Government about the relations between Poland and Ukraine. The consequence of these negotiations was a Convention signed in Warsaw on April 21, 1920. In that time the Government of the Ukrainian Republic headed by Isaac Mazepa was remaining in Ukraine.

According to this Convention a new frontier between Ukraine and Poland was established: those Ukrainian territories Poland had seized in 1919 in the war with the Ukrainians (Galicia, Volhynia etc.) remained on the Polish side. The Polish Government undertook to support the restoration of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic on the territories occupied by Soviet Russia.

The war of Poland and Ukraine against Soviet Russia, which was carried on with changing fortunes did not bring the expected results to the Ukrainians. The Polish leaders thought it more advantageous for themselves to come to an agreement with Soviet Russia after having divided the Ukrainian territories with Moscow (Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921). Poland recognised in Riga the Government of the 'independent' Soviet Ukraine and broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army which in fighting against the overwhelming Russian forces, had entered Polish territories together with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1920) was interned. The soldiers of this army, who had fought against Soviet Russia not only for Ukraine but for Poland alike, were placed by the Polish Government in camps in such conditions that many of them died there, or acquired serious diseases.

The conventional tariff is modified in favour of various nations in respect of specified items according to the commercial treaties mentioned below. 651

(*d*) *Commercial Treaties*

The Ukraine having hitherto formed part of the Russian Empire, the commercial treaties of the Empire have had full force there. Up to the year 1893, notwithstanding any treaties existing, all European nations were on the same footing in relation to the Russian tariff. Since then the following special conventions as to tariffs have been concluded: 648 439

With France.—A treaty of 1893 provides for a reduction of Russian duties on 52 articles of French origin, in exchange for a reduced French tariff on naphtha and its products.

With Serbia.—A treaty of commerce and navigation, signed in 1893, agrees to a decrease of the Russian duty on Serbian fruits, in exchange for Serbian concessions on fish and mineral oils.

With Germany.—By a treaty of commerce signed in 1894, Russia lowered her duties in favour of Germany on 135 articles, in consideration of which she obtained most-favoured-nation treatment from Germany.

With Portugal.—A general convention of 1895 arranged that Russia should benefit by certain reductions of the Portuguese tariff, and that Portuguese cork and cork products should be allowed a 20 per cent. reduction of duty on entering Russia.

With Japan.—A general treaty, signed in 1895, placed Japan, in respect of her commercial relations with Russia, on a similar footing to that of European countries.

With Bulgaria.—In 1897 the Russian tariff on dried meat, eggs, and undressed leather was lowered in favour of Bulgaria, and attar of roses was admitted free of duty. In return, certain general concessions and most-favoured-nation treatment were accorded by Bulgaria to Russia.

648 2:1 Asia generally has peculiar commercial relations with Russia, the duties on both sides being as a rule low, while numerous arrangements for reciprocal concessions have been made, notably with Persia, the Turkish Empire, and China.

(D) FINANCE

(1) PUBLIC FINANCE

652 The Russian Imperial revenue is largely raised in indirect taxes. The budget for 1911 shows the following revenue figures:

		Roubles.
Direct taxes		210,000,000
Indirect taxes:		
Liquor	42,000,000	
Tobacco	69,000,000	
Sugar	123,000,000	
Petroleum	44,000,000	
Matches	18,000,000	
Customs	289,000,000	
		585,000,000
Duties:		
Stamps, fees on transfers, harbour dues, railway dues		169,000,000
Royalties:		
Mines, mint, posts and telegraphs, and spirit monopoly		849,000,000
State property, including railways		765,000,000
Remainder		122,000,000
Total		2,700,000,000

The principal spending departments were the Ministries of Ways and Communications, War, and Finance, and the Public Debt service. These accounted for three-fourths of the expenditure.

II

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TEXT OF THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK, BETWEEN THE UKRAINE AND THE CENTRAL POWERS, FEBRUARY 9, 1918

A TREATY of peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one part, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other part. The Ukraine people having, in the course of the present world-war, declared itself independent and expressed the wish to restore peace between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Powers at war with Russia, the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey have resolved to agree on a peace treaty with the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic. They thereby desire to take the first step towards a lasting world-peace, honourable for all parties, which shall not only put an end to the horrors of war, but shall also lead to the restoration of friendly relations between the peoples in the political, legal, economic and intellectual realms. To this end the plenipotentiaries of the above-mentioned Governments, namely, for the Imperial German Government, the Foreign Secretary, Baron von Kühlmann; for the joint Austro-Hungarian Government, the Foreign Minister, Count Czernin; for the Bulgarian Government, the Premier, Mr. Radoslavov, and the envoys, Mr. Andrea Toschev, Mr. Ivan Staia Stoyanovitch, the military plenipotentiary, Colonel Peter Gantchev, and Doctor Theodor Anastassov; for the Imperial Ottoman Government, the Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, the Foreign Minister, Nessimi Bey, Hakki Pasha, and General Izzet Pasha; for the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Messrs. Alexander Siewrjuk, Mykola Ljubynsjkyj, and Mykola Lewytsjkyj, members of the Central Rada, have met together at Brest-Litovsk for the inauguration of peace negotiations, and, after submitting their credentials, which were found to be in good and proper form, they have reached agreement on the following conditions:

ARTICLE I.—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, declare that the state of war between them is at an end. The contracting parties are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one another.

ARTICLE II.—(*a*) Between Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, in so far as these two Powers border upon one another, those frontiers will exist which existed before the outbreak of the present war between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Russia; (*b*) farther north, the frontier of the Ukrainian People's Republic commencing at Tarnegrad, will, in general, follow the line Bilgoraj, Szoezebrzszyn, Krasnostas, Pugaszow, Radin, Meshireyschie, Sarnaki, Melnik, Wysckolitowsk, Kamenietzlitowsk, Pruschany, Wydonovskojcsce. These frontiers will be fixed in detail by a mixed commission according to the ethnographical conditions and with regard to the desires of the population; (*c*) should the Ukrainian People's Republic still have common frontiers with another of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance special agreements will be made thereupon.

ARTICLE III.—The evacuation of occupied territories will begin immediately after the ratification of the present peace treaty. The manner of carrying out the evacuation and the transfer of the evacuated territories will be determined by plenipotentiaries of the interested parties.

ARTICLE IV.—Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will be entered upon immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. The widest possible admittance of the respective parties' consuls is to be reserved for special agreements.

ARTICLE V.—The contracting parties mutually renounce reimbursement of their war costs (that is to say the State expenditure for carrying on the war) as well as indemnification for war damages (that is to say those damages which have been suffered by them and their subjects in the war areas through military measures, including all requisitions made in the enemy's country).

ARTICLE VI.—The respective prisoners of war will be permitted to return home, in so far as they do not desire, with the approval of the State concerned, to remain in its territories or proceed to another country. The regulation of questions connected herewith will follow by means of the separate treaties provided for in Article VIII.

(ARTICLE VII is a long clause covering the economic agreements made between the Ukraine and the four enemy Powers. *Inter alia* it provides for 'a reciprocal exchange, until July 31 of the current year, of the surplus of the most important agricultural and industrial products . . . for the purpose of meeting current requirements', and it revives the Russo-German Commercial Treaty of 1894–1904.)

ARTICLE VIII.—The restoration of public and private legal relations (Rechtsbeziehungen), the exchange of prisoners of war and interned civilians, the amnesty question, as well as the question of the treatment of merchantmen in the enemy's

648 hands, will be regulated in the separate treaties with the Ukrainian People's Republic, which form an essential part of the present peace treaty, and, so far as is practicable, will enter into force simultaneously therewith.

Article IX.—The agreements made in this treaty constitute an indivisible whole.

Article X.—For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Ukrainian text is authoritative for the relations between Germany and the Ukraine; the German, Hungarian, and Ukrainian text for the relations between Turkey and the Ukraine.

Final prescription. The present peace treaty will be ratified. The ratified documents shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as nothing therein prescribes otherwise, the peace treaty comes into force on its ratification. (Here follow the signatures.)

A supplementary treaty of twenty-eight articles was signed between Germany and the Ukraine on the same day. It deals with the resumption of consular relations, the revival of 'treaties, arrangements and agreements which were in force between Germany and Russia before the war', exchange of prisoners, compensation for damage, &c. (*The New Europe*, February 28, 1918.)

III

THE GERMAN COLONISTS IN S. RUSSIA (from F. Stach, *Survey of the History of the Colonists in S. Russia and their Present Life.* Moscow, 1916.)

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Realizing that in the southern territories acquired by Russia in the eighteenth century only colonists with a certain amount of culture could introduce a settled life and develop the resources of the country, Catherine the Great published a manifesto on December 4, 1762, inviting foreign colonists. As a result, 102 colonies were established on the Lower Volga in the Saratov and Samara Governments, 6 in Chernigov, 1 in Voronezh, 2 in Lifland, and 6 in the Petrograd Government. A further manifesto followed on July 22, 1763, enlarging the privileges of the colonists, which were very considerable.

This manifesto was the basis of the colonies of Russia. On March 19, 1764, a supplementary act was issued granting 30 desyatines of land to each family and prescribing the method of settling and rights of inheritance. The land was to pass to youngest son; this measure would force the father to teach

668 642 175 the parties. At the same time the process of making Ukrainians of the various divisions of the troops on the front began, so that within a few months the Central Council had about one and one-half to two million Ukrainian soldiers at their disposal. But in spite of this enormous army, the Central Council by and large yielded to the orders of the Kerenskii government of Moscow. Its further policy is characterized by the four manifestoes which it issued up to the time of its dissolution in April 1919. On June 23, 1917 the first manifesto of the Central Council announced the autonomy of the Ukraine. It was to maintain its own parliament, the Central Council, and a /58/ government, the general secretariat. On July sixteenth the second manifesto followed, giving particulars as to what was meant by autonomy, and containing an emphatic declaration for confederacy. In its manifesto of November 19, 1917 after Lenin had already stepped into power, the Central Council still clung to the union with Moscow. Again in this "Universal"-that was what the manifestoes were called - which proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic, there was mention of federation with Moscow. On December fourteenth the Council of 648 175 People's Commissars in Moscow recognized "the Ukrainian People's Republic and its right to separate completely from Russia or to enter negotiations for a federation or similar relationships." But in the same document of recognition the Council of People's Commissars laid down the condition that the disarming of Red troops in the Ukraine would have to cease and that the Central Council would have to desist from its "counter-revolutionary activity". Should the People's Commissars fail to obtain a satisfactory answer to this demand within 48 hours, "the Council of People's Commissars would assume that the Central Council was in a state of open warfare against the Soviet government." A few days after this recognition coupled with an ultimatum Bolshevik troops broke into the Ukraine. In Khar'kov there was formed a Ukrainian-Bolshevik counter-government, and Moscow's

648 war against Kiyev began.

668 Straightway Bolshevik propaganda made itself felt in the Ukraine. It was easy to unleash revol-

175 utionary energies, after the Central Council had prepared the ground with the same arguments, albeit in a weaker form. In the country unbridled peasant rebellion against the squires raged. It was arable land and fine cattle and horses on the farms that the peasants wanted; they did not care who ruled in the cities. This was the state of affairs in the Ukraine when on January 22, 1918 the Central Council in Kiyev in a fourth manifesto proclaimed the sovereign "Ukrainian People's /59/ Republic" and put into effect separation from "indivisible Russia". However, at the same time it did not forget to announce that after the overthrow of Bolshevism, there should again be cooperation with Russia. The manifesto which was meant at last to arouse national passions suppressed for so long, was not heard in the noise of general rebellion. A few days after the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the parliament and the government at Kiyev were surprised by a revolt of Bolsheviks and its members were arrested. If they had not been freed by the Ukrainian sharpshooters of the sech who became the nucleus of the later Ukrainian armies, and the corps of free Cossacks consisting of workmen, these parliamentarians would have faced certain death. It was precisely in those days that the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk recognized the independent Ukrainian People's Republic on February 9, 1918. Vienna was facing a famine and needed grain, so the peace was favorable to the Ukraine. For the adjudication of national sovereignty they were obliged to furnish a half million tons of grain. The "peace for bread" had been signed one day when the Bolsheviks drove the Central Council out of their capital. In March the situation became so threatening for the Ukrainian government that it was obliged to appeal to the Central Powers

648 668 175 for occupation and riddance of the Ukraine from Bolsheviks. Thereupon German and Austro-Hungarian troops occupied the country. In Kiyev the Central Powers established military, diplomatic and political representation. In order to take the wind out of the sails of the vigorous Bolshevik agitation, the Central Council nevertheless saw itself forced to continue its revolutionary activity. Thus, against their will, they led "the country toward a complete social-revolutionary dissolution in which East Ukraine had inevitably to fall victim to the Bolshevism of Moscow." (40)

40. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism.

It is obvious that the conservatively-minded German authorities had no understanding of such governmental tricks as would seriously jeopardize /60/ the furnishing of grain. Therefore they supported the attempt of the former aide-de-camp of the Czar and Russian general of Ukrainian origin, Pavlo Skoropadskyj, to introduce the monarchical office of hetman instead of the Republican Central Council. 668 175 On April 29, 1918 Pavlo Skoropadskyj, the offspring of a hetman family, proclaimed a new hetman state in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the indigenous props of this monarchical regime were very weak. If he had not been protected from the beginning by the authority of the army of occupation, the revolutionary masses would have driven him out along with his few dozens of landowners, industrialists, merchants and officers on the very first day. Skoropadskyj's first efforts were directed toward restoring the prerevolutionary social conditions in the country, during which process his men did not shrink from severe penal expeditions and from the use of the "traditional Russian wisdom" - the club. This led to repeated bloody rebellions on the part of the embittered peasants. An uneducated, fermenting,

destitute mass of humanity, as yet incapable of
668 self-administration, a much too small middle class
175 and a corrupt reactionary society at the head,-
these were the elements of the hetman state. But
it was the hetman's doom that, for lack of a
national Ukrainian conservative stratum, he was
obliged to lean more and more on the old domiciled
Russian circles who in the end completely won over
the Ukrainian head of the state to their reactionary
plans. On November 14, 1918 Skoropadskyj set
642 up an Old Russian government in Kiyev and announced
● 648 the federation of the Ukraine with a czarist Russia
175 which, however, was never again to arise. Twenty-four
hours after the announcement of the annexation
of the Ukraine to this fictitious czarist
Russia, the revolt of the "Ukrainian National
League" against Skoropadskyj and the Old Russian
counter-revolutionaries broke out. There begins
the period of the second Ukrainian People's Republic,
at the head of which is a five-man governing
board. At the end of the /61/ seven-month rule of
Skoropadskyj, after his flight from the new Ukrainian
government, he made the following confession
in his last manifesto of December 14, 1918: "God
did not give me the strength to attain my goal."

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In the meantime Austria-Hungary also approached its dissolution. On October 10, 1918 in the Imperial Council of Vienna, the Ukrainian parliamentarians from Galicia demanded the right of self-government for the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary; it was only a few days before the collapse of the Empire. On the eighteenth of October the Ukrainian members of the Imperial Council and the Diet in Lwów founded the Ukrainian National Council which on the following day proclaimed the union of all Ukrainian territories in Austria-Hungary. The National Council set up three executive committees and therewith imagined it had done all that

was necessary. Then they believed a telegram of 642
the Western powers containing the confirmation or 648
the order to make use of self-government and found 175
the West Ukrainian state would come fluttering into the house. The parliamentarians who received their political education in the lobbies of the Imperial Council building had complete faith in the magic formula of self-government and were waiting to see what the Western powers would have to say. Action was taken only by several companies of East Galician-Ukrainian troops who in the night of the first of November seized Lwów in a surprise attack. The Galician capital was predominantly inhabited by Poles and Jews, and the Poles immediately countered with a revolt. The Ukrainian National Council was still waiting patiently; it had made no real preparations to take over power in Galicia. Thus its appeals must be directed to the anonymous masses, "To everyone", with the request that they lend a helping hand everywhere and intervene everywhere. Finally on November ninth the government, the temporary state secretariat, was formed and the division of governmental power very neatly handled. The /62/ National Council was to make the laws, the State Secretariat was to see that they were enforced. Then the order was given that all "necessary steps be taken to unite all the Ukrainian provinces into one state". The new state called itself the "West Ukrainian People's Republic". Its alliance with the East "Ukrainian People's Republic" was solemnly announced on January 22, 1919 in Kiyev. The West Ukrainian People's Republic was given the name "Western Territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic". In reality, however, conditions remained as before between the West Ukrainian and the East Ukrainian state, in spite of formal amalgamation. Both states continued to be independent allies, small West Ukraine being the stronger.

The West Ukrainian state was obliged from the beginning to reckon with opponents who were

642 •648 175 bent on the most extreme measures. Roman Dmovski, chairman of the Polish National Committee founded in Paris during the war and leader of the Polish delegation at the peace negotiations, was the most bitter enemy of any kind of Ukrainian state. He countered the partition of Great Russia at Brest Litovsk with the partitioning of the Ukraine. It was completely in accordance with his ideas when as early as February 28, 1918, after Brest Litovsk, the Paris National Committee decided completely to destroy Ukrainian state in East Europe at any cost. To this end Polish agents in Paris, London and Washington used all their powers of persuasion on leading politicians and newspapers. They wisely suppressed the fact that Polish plans secretly included the entire Ukraine west of the Dniepr which had fallen to Russia in the partitions of Poland. These opponents of independent Ukrainian state were augmented: the Polish army of General Haller, which was formed in the summer of 1918 on French soil and which was recognized as the "confederate army" on the twenty-eighth of September, arrived in Poland.

West Ukraine could be nothing more than booty or a tool in the hands of the Allies. Inasmuch as France /63/ wanted to build up against Germany a Poland that was as strong as possible, it was best that Poland subjugate West Ukraine and thus exclude any threat from the rear. Only Foch for a time entertained the plan of erecting a Ukrainian vassal state and of throwing in its soldiers against the Bolsheviks. For the English Liberals, West Ukraine was an object of barter which could be used as an extortionary measure against the French, or, if there was no other way, could be made into a mandate state under the supervision of the League of Nations.

The fiercest enemies of the East Ukrainian 648 175 statehood, however, were the Bolsheviks who, fully aware of the fateful significance of a loss of the

248 Ukraine for the Muscovite realm, strained every
175 effort to fight for the country. The Pan-Russian counter-revolutionary armies also proved themselves opponents not to be underestimated. "The campaigns of Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich and other Russian generals clearly proved that there were only two forces fighting in the Russian civil war: the old Czarist absolutism against the new Bolshevik despotism. And both of them fought with equal ferocity against the Ukraine." (41)

41. Danko: The Nation in Soviet Chains, page 25.

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726 A surprise attack of the Ukrainian troops on Lwów set off the Polish-West Ukrainian War.
175 For weeks wild fighting raged in the streets of the city; finally the Poles succeeded in bringing in troops and forcing the Ukrainians out of Lwów during the night of November 22, 1918. The victors exercised bloody reprisals on the Ukrainian population; they destroyed Ukrainian property and dragged many respected citizens into concentration camps from which they were never to return. The Jews expiated for their neutrality with a three-day pogrom, during which whole blocks of houses went up in flames.

[631] After the loss of Lwów, the West Ukrainian state included about 40,000 square kilometers with
642 four million /64/ inhabitants, among them three
648 million Ukrainians. To destroy this dwarf state was the firm intention of the leaders of the Polish
726 state of eighteen million. The Ukrainian govern-
175 ment now had its seat at Stanislawów; Dr. Ievgen Petrushevych was the head of the state. He and many other men who were responsible for the fate of West Ukraine still regarded it as "an incident, a misunderstanding, an error" that there was any fighting at all between Poles and Ukrainians. Heedless of the front which was expanding day by

642 day and of the increasingly bloody battles, they
648 abandoned themselves to the illusion that these
misunderstandings would merely have to be cleared
726 up and all would be well. They believed that
175 patience was required until the Allies carried out the right of self-government for which the Ukrainians alone were obliged to fight with weapons. "The fact that individual destinies must be determined by the will of the individual - such points of view which are so familiar to conquering nations, were completely foreign to the 'Ukrainian National Council', all the more since there was not a single, in any way outstanding, personality in leading political circles, who would have been capable in a critical situation to grasp the reins and direct events." (42)

42. Kuchabskyj: West Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 52.

175 The war which at the beginning was carried
726 on with a few thousand men on both sides was in full force by the end of December. At this time the Ukrainians successfully mobilized their fighting manpower up to 35 years of age. Then, however, they made the mistake of abandoning warfare in the open country and of leaving the initiative to the Poles who, in keeping with their reckless methods, made use of it. In spite of the fact that the Ukrainian front which ran northward from the Carpathians presented considerable deficiencies along its approximately 250-kilometer length, that the battalions, for example, were strung together loosely and without a unified supreme command, nevertheless the Polish troops which arrived from mid-January on suffered heavy defeats. Thus Gen-
000 eral Romer /Facing page 64/ /Above: A typical Ukrainian church made of wood, in the Carpathians. Below: Ukrainian peasant woman baking bread./[1] /Facing page 65/ /The Ukrainian landscape is full

[1] [This plate not processed for files — Analyst]

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[Volhynia] [Ruthenia]

186 Nothing happened there which their special reporters did not describe in detail. In neighboring
Volhynia which, for easier Polonization, was
separated from Galicia by a Chinese wall, /83/
and where Ukrainian newspapers from Lwów were forbidden, people paid two zloty, the equivalent of
186 two marks, for the smuggled papers. Radios were
208 much in demand[1] and the cooperatives which ordinarily sold shoelaces, underwear and soap, were
suddenly supposed to furnish radio sets. The
members wanted it. They brought their zloty, and
when these did not suffice they paid in chickens
and eggs. Half the village listened to the reports
from a friendly broadcasting station in the Ukrainian language, picked up by a common receiving set.
The people did not mind at all that they were
obliged to stand or squat as close together as
sardines in a can.

The "audition" cost five groschen which
amounts to two and one-half pfennig. Anyone who
had no money paid with an egg for news taken from
the ether. What they heard on these occasions were
sometimes their own wish-dreams. The autonomous
government, which set up its residence first in
Uzhgorod and then, until the country's reintegration into Hungary, in Khust, had great plans. The
listeners discussed this with great animation.

● 648 The peasants who could write set down on
186 paper the result of long deliberation about exist-
208 ing conditions as well as their wishes for the
future, in the form of letters and sent them to
the Polish President as well as to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister Voloshyn and to a foreign
statesman from whom they hoped to get help. Most
of these letters got only as far as the office of
648 the voivode. Thereupon Poland's fist became day
by day more oppressive. The autonomy of the
neighboring small country, however meager it was,
was a violent shock to Polish power. Warsaw
desired the quickest possible disappearance of
Carpatho-Ukraine. On December third the head of

[1] [i.e., 1938-39 among the Ukrainians in Volhynia - Awdy ?]

[Ruthenia]

648 the "Camp of National Unity", General Skwarszynski, said in the Sejm: /the Polish parliament/ "... The common boundary with Hungary as a Danubian state and as a people traditionally friendly to us, corresponds not only to our feelings, but also to our interests. Therefore Hungary's aim to /84/ obtain Carpatho-Ukraine must be energetically supported by our foreign policy." The
186 speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Mudryj protest-
648 ed against this Polish policy[1] at the same meeting: "We must not forget that the Ukrainian people, on the basis of common blood, common tradition and a common spirit feels itself to be a unified national organism, regardless of what state it lives in and under what governments it falls. No power will crush this feeling of national unity." (48)

48. "Osteuropa", January issue, 1931, page 260.

When Mudryj referred to the devastation caused by the "diversional detachments" in Carpatho-Ukraine, he was silenced.

000 Poland had a bad conscience. The Carpatho-Ukrainian question, unimportant though it was, made it nervous. The great power grew unsure of itself and from old habit tried to set force against the right to live. According to the Polish / political thesis only "another dialect" is to separate the Ukrainians from the Poles. If one took away their Greek Orthodox religion and their Cryillic script, they would differ from the Poles merely by reason of their dialect.

177 However, the Ukrainians have changed tremendously since the days when Emperor Joseph II said, at the end of his journey through Galicia, which was freed after hundreds of years of Polish domination: "The peasant is an unfortunate creature possessing nothing but a human exterior and physical life." In the 150 years that Vienna was their capital, the Ukrainians experienced an ex-

[1] [i.e., 1935-39, to aid Hungary to obtain Carpatho-Ukraine - [illegible]]

[Ruthenia]

177 traodrinary national, economic and cultural advance, and the war of liberation from 1918 to 1919 became indelibly fixed in their national consciousness. Volhynia, too, awakened as a nation.

186 648 No wonder, then, that after a mock autonomy was granted by the Polish parliament on September 22, 1922 - in accordance with the request of the Supreme Council of June 25, 1919 - and after the conference of the Parisian emissary /85/ of March 15, 1923, which adjudicated Galicia to the Poles, no wonder that the Ukrainians in Poland have continued to fight against Warsaw's rule with other means. The Ukrainians are helpless against drastic measures such as the introduction of Polish civilian administration or the closing of Ukrainian schools. They suffer national losses especially in the parcelling of large estates, which brings new Polish settlers into the overpopulated country and which leaves the Ukrainian small farmer out in the cold. The Poles have already succeeded in pushing back the western Ukrainian boundary by about thirty kilometers; they are successfully Polonizing Polesia where, because of the extreme backwardness and poverty of the inhabitants, hunger is a stronger motivating power than anything else. In 1905 the Ukrainians already lost 250,000 citizens in Lublin, which was then Russian, and which, after the first World War, became Polish. These people who were forcibly converted to the orthodox faith in 1870 went over to the Roman Catholic Church 35 years later; for their return to the Greek Catholic Church to which they had belonged before that was denied them. But becoming Roman Catholic means becoming Polonized. Once the Polish clergyman has set foot in a town, he is soon followed by the teacher, Polish societies are founded and the village is isolated from the Ukrainian neighborhood as from the area of infection.

184 became autocephalous during the Revolution, 795 have dissolved. In the wide realm of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics there is no visible ecclesiastical authority whatsoever. No one knows how many priests are secretly carrying on their duties. Churches are closed and have been transformed into "godless museums" or clubs. East Rome is without power and without priests.

It was said of Pius XI: "The Holy Father 648 is much concerned about the re-unification of 795 the East. It may be said that he has made this the goal of his life." (58) Pius XII, as may be seen by the honor bestowed on Vladimir, cherishes the same plans.

But the Soviet Union remained closed to the emissaries of the Vatican. Everything was done that could be done. In 1918 the Vatican hastened to send an ambassador to Kiyev. But before he arrived the addressee of the credentials, Hetman Skoropadsky, was already fleeing to the West. In 1922 to 1923 papal aid to the starving is supposed to "prepare the ground" for the seed which none other but Nuntius Pacelli scattered when in all secrecy in Berlin, he consecrated a Jesuit organizer as bishop of this charitable work; the Jesuit who is passing through must be consecrated secretly, in order that the Bolsheviks do not become suspicious and that the "simple" father who is apparently only concerned about apportioning the food that is handed out, can unostentatiously appoint five bishops. In this manner the first Catholic prelates are installed in the Ukraine. How often they have made use of their sacred powers and how many Catholic bishops and priests there are today in Soviet Ukraine is not known even in the Vatican.

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58. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 38.

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After this first chapter of Muscovite national policy was completed, the second one began: the "New Economic Policy" (NEP). The Soviet Union was urgently in need of composure, of a breather and recuperation. The Bolsheviks in Moscow, therefore, loosened the reins and introduced the semi-free economy in which land, large enterprises and the banks remained the property of the state, the peasants obtained the usufruct of the land, and a free market could regulate
•648 the distribution of goods. Simultaneously with the NEP, Moscow launched a second enterprise: the nationalization of non-Russian peoples. For it was necessary to administer in small doses and in as attractive a form as possible, Bolshevist ideology to the Ukrainians, the White Ruthenians, the Caucasian and all other peoples who were under Moscow's rule. With the XII Congress of the Communist Party in 1922 the policy of Ukrainization was adopted, to be sure only in the area of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic with its 443,000 square kilometers of surface and approximately 23 million Ukrainians, while the many millions of Ukrainians in the White Ruthenian Soviet Republic, the Russian Soviet Republic including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in the Kuban area, on the Volga and in Siberia were at that time already being de-nationalized. During that XII Congress in 1923, the following words were spoken about the Ukraine: "This is one of the problems which threaten to involve Soviet Russia and the Party in the greatest complications. It is one of those problems which, we must admit frankly and honestly, will promulgate civil war if we do not approach it with delicacy and understanding."

The Ukrainian Communists adopted Moscow's
661 slogan without hesitation. To Ukrainize - that
648 meant to give Ukrainians leading positions in the government, in the Party, in the cooperatives, in economy, in the press and in the school system; /114/ it also meant using Ukrainian as the offi-

661 648 cial language and promoting Ukrainian culture in all its aspects, in science and art. The process was carried on so eagerly in all fields that in the course of it the task of converting people to Bolshevism seemed almost to be forgotten. In fact, a Ukrainian national Bolshevist movement was started, which soon ran into opposition with Moscow. It was headed by the People's Commisar for Popular Education, Shumskyj, whose group openly opposed the "exploitative colonial policy of Moscow". The situation was not too good within the Communist Party of the Ukraine. Shumskyj divulged this in his speech of May 12, 1926: "Within the Party, the Russian Communist prevails; he does not trust the Ukrainian Communist and is hostile toward him." (59)

59. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 12.

648 How weak the position of Moscow was after the subjugation of the Ukraine is shown by the Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1923, in which the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as well as the remaining national republics of the Union had to be formally recognized. The defense system, the transportation system, finances and foreign policy were declared to be affairs of the state. The Foreign Commissariat in Moscow established a branch in Khar'kov, which at that time was the Soviet Ukrainian capital.

661 648 The process of Ukrainization reached its external climax with the visit of the Ukrainian champion of liberty Colonel Konovalets who in 1918 and 1919 had carried on the bitterest battles against the Bolsheviks and now visited Kiyev at the invitation of the President of Soviet Ukraine, Petrovskyj. Like so many other emigrants he, too, had let himself be dazzled by Muscovite nationalist policy. What Petrovsky was able to show his West Ukrainian guest was indeed astonishing com-

661 pared with that which remained to the Ukrainians in Poland. The old cultural city on the Dniepr
•648 was experiencing a new efflorescence; 70% of all students in Soviet Ukraine were attending Ukrainian schools. There had been nothing like
[214] it since the days of the Cossacks. /115/ Between 1918 and 1928 the Academy of Sciences published
[217] 888 works and numerous libraries were founded. (60) Hundreds of newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets enlightened Ukrainians eager for knowledge in their mother tongue, and poetry and belles-lettres had reached a very high level. But soon black shadows were to fall on this brilliance.

Not yet satisfied with the results of the
661 policy of Ukrainization - in 1929 only 36% of
665 the officials were Ukrainians, the rest Jews and Russians (61) - the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine decided at the end of December, 1929, to intensify the process of nationalization. Especially the working classes were to take an active part in Ukrainian cultural life; Ukrainian theaters were to put on regular performances in the industrial areas; there were to be "Ukrainization cells" formed in the factories, the high union posts and the leading positions in the cooperatives were to be held by Ukrainians, and adherence to the course of nationalization of the administrative system was to be supervised. In this manner the cities were to be Ukrainized. The Commissar of People's Education, Skrypnyk, the successor of Shumskyj, successfully sought both to disseminate Ukrainian literature

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60. Tisserand: The Ukraine, Life of a People, page 283.

61. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 17.

665 Ukrainian population prefers to read, whereas the works of Russian authors remain completely unknown in the Ukraine. It goes on to say that this is a very detrimental phenomenon, for Russian culture is important for the entire Soviet Union and for the whole world, while Ukrainian culture is of merely local significance.

Conversely, the Ukrainians accused the Muscovites of chauvinism. Stalin, the Georgian, tried to pronounce a Solomonic judgment at the Sixteenth Party Congress in June 1930 by condemning both Great Russian and Ukrainian nationalism: "Great Russian chauvinism under the communists reflects the efforts of the ruling classes of former Russia to reconstruct their lost privileges of domination over other peoples. As a result, the chauvinism of Great Russia is the chief danger in the national policy of the Communist Party." In accordance with these ideas, the Sixteenth Congress adopted the resolution that the Party should /117/ intensify its fight against Great Russian deviation and the deviations of "local nationalism".

648 182 As a matter of fact, Ukrainian nationalism* was indeed becoming a danger to Bolshevik Moscow. As compared to the period of war-communism, the Ukraine was living in remarkably comfortable circumstances. [369] The fact that the majority of the Ukrainian people, the rural population, enjoyed an adequate subsistence, must have had a positively irritating effect on the urban masses in their wretched circumstances.* Was not this an open refutation of the communist doctrine? There was the additional fact that the Ukrainians became more and more importunate with their varied demands, and that the power of the Ukrainian government had increased so much during the NEP period, that finally it headed the opposition of non-Russian peoples in the Council of Nationalities (the second chamber next to the Supreme Council) and forced Moscow several times to change its

* [During the NEP period in the Soviet Union — Analyst]

648 162 budget plans. If things went on in this way the social system of communism would face serious crises as a result of the flourishing peasant economy of the Ukraine - in the regions of Great Russia communal ownership of fields has prevailed since ancient times - and the Muscovite conception of national unity might be seriously threatened by the increasing power of "assembled peoples".

In order to avoid these dangers and also in view of other considerations, Stalin discontinued the New Economic Policy and introduced the period of the Five Year Plans. In spite of the decision of the Sixteenth Party Congress, the way to Russianization was opened, and Ukrainization discontinued; Ukrainian nationalism received a hard blow when free peasant farming was immediately liquidated. There have been untold victims of these revolutionary processes which were attended by violent upheavals from the time Stalin announced his principle of "socialism within one country".

"Socialism within one country" demanded
648 185 industrialization as the presupposition for the independence of the socialistic /118/ state. This industrialization had to take place throughout the realm and according to a unified plan. Every form of particularism could only be detrimental - the Ukrainian form doubly so; for in the Ukraine are the coal and metal and the water power reserves of the Dniepr from which horsepower by the millions can be obtained. Such considerations led to the First Five Year Plan, in the course of which Ukrainian economy, heavy industry, finance and particularly agriculture were subordinated to orders from Moscow. The division of private economy was "liquidated".

661 The new system* introduced the purging of the Pan-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the year 1930, where members of the "League for the Liberation of the Ukraine" had entrenched themselves; they were now "unmasked". In a monster trial in

*[i.e., Beginning of the Five year Plans — Analyst]

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668 parties which came into legal existence sent, together with national minorities, their representatives to the Rada.

At the beginning, the Rada did not aim to separate the Ukraine as an independent state from Russia, but asked, during the negotiations with the Provisional Government, a territorial autonomy in federation with Russia. It further demanded that the Russian Government abstain from interference in Ukrainian internal affairs. However, this modest demand was first rejected by the Provisional Government in Petersburg, and led the majority of the Ukrainian people into believing that the new Government in Russia was prepared to continue the policy of the Tsars regarding the non-Russian people. As a result, the possibility of establishing peaceful and friendly relations among the various nationalities was jeopardized by the Russians themselves.

Taking note of the strong determination on the part of the people, the Ukrainian Central Rada issued, on June 23, 1917, its first universal "declaration" in which the "Autonomous Ukrainian Republic" was proclaimed. Informing the Ukrainian people about the unsuccessful negotiations with the Provisional Government in Petersburg, the Rada declared that "from this day on, we ourselves will create our own destiny."[6] Simultaneously, a General Secretariat, with Wolodymyr Winnichenko at its head, was formed. It took shape as the Ukrainian Government while the Central Rada was reorganized as the revolutionary parliament.

648 During the short life of the Provisional Government, only the Bolshevik Party took the existing facts into account. Lenin, who previously did not believe in a Bolshevik victory in Russia during his lifetime, recognized, after his return from Switzerland in April, 1917, that administrative incapacity and the political blunders of the Provisional Government offered a reasonable chance immediately to seize political power in Russia. Analyzing the situation, Lenin introduced the program of the Bolshevik Party which promoted such revolutionary slogans as self-determination of nations within Russia and their right

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[6] M. Hrushevsky, *The History of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1945), p. 526.

[7] The Seventh (April) Conference of the All-Russian Social-Democratic Labor (Bolshevik) Party, held on May 7-12, 1917 adopted a resolution on the National Question in which the policy toward non-Russian peoples was formulated. Among other points, the resolution stressed: "The right of all nations forming part of Russia to freely secede and form independent states shall be recognized. To negate this right or to fail to take measures guaranteeing its practical realization, is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure and annexation. . . ."

to secede from Russia.[7] At the beginning, these revolutionary slogans won many sympathizers for the Bolsheviks among non-Russian nations, since it was believed that the Bolshevik Party was the only political group in Russia which would not oppose the creation of the national States. For example, Stalin, whom Lenin deemed an expert on the national question, went so far as to openly denounce the methods of the Provisional Government in dealing with the Ukrainian problems. He declared that the accusation of treason levelled against the leaders of the Ukraine only concealed the plan to destroy the idea of national liberation. Shortly before the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, Stalin wrote:

> No one has the right to interfere in the internal life of nations and to correct their mistakes by force. The nations are independent in the question of their internal life; therefore, they have the right to determine freely their own destiny.[8]

Only at a time of crisis, when the Provisional Government began to lose control over the developments in Russia, did its representatives I. G. Tsereteli, M. Tereschenko and A. Kerensky resume negotiations with the Rada in Kiev. A compromise agreement was concluded on July 11, 1917 in which the Provisional Government recognized "without delay" the autonomy of the Ukraine and the General Secretariat as the governing body of Ukrainian affairs. The result of this agreement was proclaimed in the second universal "declaration" to the Ukrainian people on July 16, 1917. Even then, many representatives of the Provisional Government were reluctant to recognize the existing facts. Prime Minister G. E. Lvoff as well as his Cadet Ministers (Constitutional Democrats) resigned on July 16, 1917 in protest against the "concessions" granted to the Ukrainians.[9]

While the Provisional Government continued the struggle against the Ukraine, the Bolshevik Party recognized, without hesitation, the Ukrainian Rada as the legal government. However, later develop-

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[8] J. V. Stalin, "Counter-revolution and the People of Russia," *Sotchineniya*, Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1946), p. 207.

[9] The American Ambassador in Russia, Francis, informed the Secretary of State on July 16, 1918: ". . . Cause (of the resignation of the Cadet Ministers) attributed is that Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Posts and Telegraphs who returned yesterday from Ukraine had granted that province concessions with which Cadet party unable to agree. . . ." Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia 1918*, Vol. II (Washington, 1932), p. 646.

[the National Central Rada (council) organized in 1917 — Analyst]

● 648 ments proved that this was only a formal recognition of existing facts and a desire to win confidence among non-Russian people. The Provisional Government's mistakes and incompetence resulted in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, which led to the establishment of the Soviet regime.[10]

648 668 After the revolution, Stalin was appointed Commissar of Nationalities. Lenin believed that the appointment of the non-Russian Dzugashwili to this post would make the Bolshevik slogans even more acceptable to the non-Russian peoples. He had ready plans for the occupation of the Ukraine and other semi-independent countries but did not have the military might needed to crush their national Governments. Therefore, Lenin turned to the method of infiltrating destructive forces into the Ukraine in order to weaken its independence from within. The Bolsheviks were aware of the fact that, if the Ukraine remained independent, Soviet Russia would have tremendous difficulties in carrying out the plan of "liberation" of other countries in the future. Therefore, the declaration of the right of nations to self-determination, officially proclaimed by the Bolsheviks, proved to be valid only as long as it served the purpose of strengthening the Soviet regime. Once the Bolsheviks were in power, they openly demonstrated that between the policy of white and red Moscow toward the Ukraine there was little or no difference. Recognizing this fact, the formerly subjugated nations were even more determined to promote their liberation from Moscow. On November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian National Rada proclaimed independence by issuing the Third Universal. The Government still believed in an eventual federation with a free Russia, which would recognize Ukrainian independence and would abstain from interference in its internal affairs. This viewpoint was expressed in a note to the Allied powers.[11] Again, the Russian anti-Soviet political and military leaders refused to accept such

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[10] Professor Masaryk, former President of the Czechoslovakian Republic and a well known authority on Russia, comments on the easy Bolshevik victory: "The way for Lenin's regime had been prepared by the Provisional Government and by Kerensky, both of whom showed administrative incapacity and entrusted wide spheres of action to bad and incompetent men. . . . Lenin was a logical consequence of Russian illogicality." *The Making of a State, Memories and Observances, 1914-1918* (London, 1927), p. 176.

[11] On December 12, 1917, the Secretary of State for International Affairs of the Ukraine, Shulgin, despatched notes to the Allied powers informing them about the desire of the Ukrainian Government to enter into friendly relations with the free States as an independent power. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia,* Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 650.

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a solution. At a later date, these anti-Soviet forces indirectly helped the Bolsheviks to remain in power.[12]

On December 17, 1917, Lenin dispatched an ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada in which he demanded: recognize the Soviet Government within forty-eight hours or take the consequences of an open war. With this action, the Soviet Government inaugurated the policy of "persuasion" by force. The Rada rejected the Soviet ultimatum in an answer on December 19, 1917, and urged the Ukrainian people to be prepared to defend their freedom.[13] The determination of the Ukrainian people to defend their liberty forced the Bolsheviks to change their tactics. They decided to postpone their open aggression and instead to appeal directly to the Ukrainian masses.

The Bolsheviks inspired a Congress of workers and peasants to meet at Kiev on December 18, 1917. Contrary to their expectations, a large majority of the delegates took an energetic stand for the right of the Rada to represent the Ukrainian people. Only 80 out of a total of 2,000 delegates supported the Bolsheviks. This small minority proceeded to Kharkov, where the Congress of Proletarians (radical elements from Donez Basin, mostly non-Ukrainians), was held. At the session of Decemer 27, 1917, this group proclaimed itself the "only representative body" of the Ukraine and issued an appeal for help to the Soviet Government of Russia. Two days later, the Sovnarcom welcomed, in a special resolution, this "new revolutionary Govern-

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[12] In his report "On National Factors in Party and State Development" Stalin stated: "Do not forget such reserves as those constituted by the oppressed peoples, who remain silent, but whose very silence exerts pressure and decides much. This is often not felt, but these peoples live, they exist, and they must not be forgotten. Yes, Comrades, it is dangerous to forget them. Do not forget that if in the rear of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel and Yudenich we had not had the so-called 'aliens,' the oppressed people who disorganized the rear of these generals by their tacit sympathy for the Russian proletarians —comrades, this is a specific factor in our development, this tacit sympathy, which nobody hears or sees, but which decides everything—if it were not for this sympathy, we would not have nailed a single one of these generals. While we were advancing on them, their rear was disintegrating. Why? Because these generals depended on the colonizing elements among the Cossacks, they held out to the oppressed peoples the prospect of further oppression, and the oppressed people were therefore *forced* into our arms while we held aloft the banner of the liberation of these oppressed peoples. That is what decided the fate of these generals; those are the factors which, although thy are obscured by the victories of our armies, in the long run decided everything. This must not be forgotten." *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), Stenograficheskij otchet, April 17-25, 1923* (Glavpolitprosvet, Moscow, 1923), p. 455.

[13] Both the Soviet ultimatum as well as the answer of the Ukrainian Government is cited in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918* (New York), pp. 437-438.

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648 668 ment" of the Ukraine and promised it unlimited help.[14] On December 29, 1917, the Red Army under command of former Tsarist Colonel Muraviov invaded the Ukrainian frontiers. The open war between Soviet-Russia and the Ukraine was a reality.[15]

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648 Despite many internal and external difficulties, the Ukrainian Government offered sufficient evidence that the people were capable of governing themselves and of defending their freedom. The Ukraine, by opposing and fighting Bolshevism—increasingly regarded as the new danger to civilization—won the sympathy of many free countries. On January 11, 1918, the French High Commissioner in Kiev, General Tabouis, was instructed by the French Government to accord in its name de-facto recognition of the Ukrainian Independent State. The British Government on January 12, 1918 delegated Bogge, its High Commissioner in Kiev, to wait only for the proper moment to recognize, together with other Allied powers, the Independence of the Ukraine. The United States also considered the recognition of the Ukrainian State after the American Consul General at Moscow informed the Secretary of State of the necessity for such a step.[16]

The Ukrainian Government's efforts to establish friendly relations with foreign countries caused the Bolsheviks to conclude that, despite their promises and changes in method, they were in no position to destroy the power of national revolutions in border countries. Lenin undoubtedly realized that in order to occupy the Ukraine, he must first make peace with external enemies. For this reason he hastened the armistice negotiations, already in progress, with the Central powers at Brest-Litovsk. During the previous negotiations the Soviet delegation, under Joffe's and later under Trotsky's leadership, entirely ignored the existence of an Ukrainian state. They acted as if the Russian delegates were the legal representatives not only of the Rus-

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[14] Stalin's article, "What is Ukrainian Rada?" *Pravda*, December 29 (15 old style), 1917.

[15] At the time when Bolshevik forces terrorized and looted the people of the Ukraine, Stalin wrote: "The people of Russia should know, that the idea of invasion of a foreign territory is strange to the Russian revolution. All people should know, that in contrast to the imperialist policy of national oppression, the Soviet government practices the policy of total liberation." *Pravda*, December 31 (old style), 1917. Cf. J. V. Stalin, *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 25.

[16] *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 655-657.

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sian but also of the Ukrainian people. This Soviet attitude reached Kiev, capitol of the Ukraine, at a time when Bolshevik forces were launching a new attack against the Ukraine with the goal of occupying Kiev at all cost. To combat the Soviet tactics at the peace Conference, the Central Rada immediately sent its plenipotentiaries to Brest-Litovsk. For ten days, the Ukrainian delegates demanded a place at the Conference table and were finally admitted to negotiations as an independent power on January 12, 1918.

In order to clarify the Ukraine's position in international relations as an independent state, the Central Rada on January 22, 1918 proclaimed total independence in the Fourth Universal.[17] On February 9, 1918, the plenipotentiaries concluded and signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers who officially recognized the sovereignty of the Ukraine.[18] Meanwhile, the Bolshevik forces succeeded in occupying large areas of the Ukraine, including Kiev.

On February 12, 1918, the Ukrainian Government formally requested the Central Powers to intervene and to help in driving out the Bolsheviks. As a result, German and Austrian armies entered the Ukraine and were welcomed by the population as liberators from Red terror and oppression. The swift advance of these forces on the whole front forced the Soviet Government in Petrograd to sign the previously-rejected peace treaty with the Central powers on March 10, 1918, the treaty in which the Bolsheviks also recognized the Ukrainian Independent State. The Ukrainian Government, having resumed full activity, trusted that the Central powers' military command would respect its independence and would not interfere in internal affairs. However, these expectations did not materialize. The Germans not only interterfered in the internal life but, gradually, conducted themselves as conquerors of the country. When the Central Rada protested against the open violation of the treaty by the occupation forces, the German Military command under General Eichorn dissolved the Ukrainian Government on April 26, 1918 and arrested the majority of its members.[19] Even the proclamation of General Pavlo Skoropadskyj as

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[17] The full text of the Fourth Universal is cited in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

[18] For a detailed story on the Brest-Litovsk Peace, see John W. Wheeler, *Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace* (New York, 1939).

[19] For an official report on the Ukrainian-German conflicts as read by German Deputy Scheidemann in the Reichstag Committee in Berlin, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 684.

● 648 Hetman of the Ukraine (April 29, 1918) did not change the situation, since a large majority of the people considered him head of a puppet government created with the help of German bayonets and, therefore, subservient to German dictation.

After the defeat of the Central powers by the Western allies at the end of 1918, the German sponsored Government was replaced by a new Ukrainian Government called "Directorium" under the leadership of Simon Petliura. At the same time, the Soviet Government annulled the Brest-Litovsk treaty and ordered its military forces to enter the Ukraine. A new war between the Ukraine and Soviet Russia began. Since the Germans had prevented the formation of a Ukrainian army, the Bolsheviks were at an advantage. In desperation, Petliura made a last attempt to combat Bolshevik aggression by concluding a very unfavorable military alliance with the Polish Government under Pilsudski's leadership.[20] The advance of the United Polish-Ukrainian Army during the summer of 1920 was reversed by a Bolshevik counter offensive. As a result, the allied forces were driven out of the Ukraine. Subsequently, the Soviet and Polish Governments agreed, in the treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, to divide the Ukrainian territories between themselves.

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After the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, Bolsheviks formed an "independent" Soviet Ukrainian Government, the members of which, directly appointed by the Kremlin, were totally subordinated to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. At this time, Stalin was in a position to openly reveal the true meaning of the Bolshevik proclamations concerning the right of non-Russian nations to self-determination when he wrote:

> We are in favor of the separation of India, Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, and the other colonies from the entente, for here separation implies the liberation of these oppressed countries from Imperialism, thus undermining the position of Imperialism and strengthening the position of revolution. We are against the separation of the border regions from Russia since separation would here involve Imperialist servitude for the border regions, thus undermining the revolutionary power of Russia and strengthening the position of Imperialism.[21]

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[20] Winston S. Churchill attached great importance to this alliance as is obvious from his book, *The Aftermath* (New York, 1929), pp. 277-278.

[21] Stalin's preface to his "Sbornik statei," 1920. Cf. *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 372.

16: Amer. Russ. Inst. (no date) 1950 RDl Ukraine RDl

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

642 Art. 14. The Ukrainian SSR reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 15. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR may not be altered without its consent.

[609] Art. 15a. The Ukrainian SSR has its own Republican military formations.

[648] Art. 15b. The Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

Art. 16. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

[641] Art. 17. Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a citizen of the USSR.
Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR equal rights with citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

631 Art. 18. The Ukrainian SSR consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Transcarpathian, Zaporozhye, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Ternopol, Kharkov, Kherson, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and control over its observance;

b) Submission of the formation of new regions constituting part of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation;

c) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions;

d) Legislation of the Ukrainian SSR;

e) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

f) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Approval of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

h) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

i) Direction of the fulfilment of the local budgets of the regions;

j) Direction of insurance and savings;

k) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

l) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

m) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

n) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernization of cities and other inhabited places;

o) Road building; direction of local transport and communications;

p) Labour legislation;

q) Direction of social maintenance;

r) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;

Moldavia

635 648 The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was created on August 2, 1940 by the decree of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. This Republic consists of a part of the former Moldavian Autonomous S.S. Republic and of a section of Bessarabia incorporated into the Soviet Union. [131 161] The creation of this new Union Republic decreased the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 3,900 square kilometres and a population of 310,000 persons[1].

The Transcarpathian Ukraine[2]

728 In June 1945 an agreement was signed in Moscow between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic that the Transcarpathian Ukraine "...which on the basis of a pact of September 10, 1919, concluded at St.Germain-en-Laye, entered the Czechoslovak Republic with the rank of an Autonomous Republic, will, according to the wish manifested by the population of the Carpatho-Ukraine and on the basis of the friendly agreement of both high contracting parties, unite with its longstanding motherland, the Ukraine, and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The frontier between Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, existing since September 29, 1938, will, with modifications described, become the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic..."

Article II of the protocol appended to the Pact said that:

"Persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality living in Czechoslovak territory have the right to opt for Soviet citizenship until January 1, 1946... Czech and Slovak nationals residing or having their permanent domicile in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine have the right to opt for Czechoslovak nationality during the time until January 1, 1946".[3]

131 311 On January 1, 1935, the area of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 12,617 square kilometres. In 1937 about half of this was covered by forests and woods; roughly 239,000 hectares were arable, and about 328,000 hectares were devoted to vineyards, market gardens, and permanent meadows and pastures.

161 As at December 1, 1930, the population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 725,357, an increase of nearly 121,000 over February 1921.[4]

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[1] Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S. Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

[2] Called by the Czechs, Sub-Carpathian Rus, or Carpatho-Ukraine.

[3] New York Times quoted by Voices of History (1945-46), Gramercy Publishing Company, New York.

[4] Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic, London.

727 first visited Kremenchug, they reported it as over 90 per cent.
361 destroyed. "About 50,000 inhabitants have returned and are living
362 in dugouts, cellars, and rubble shacks. Reconstruction is progressing slowly because of the shortage of materials. The only industries operating are a small machine shop for bridge repair parts, a textile factory, and one wing of a cigarette factory which happened to escape destruction. One bakery is being repaired... All grain elevators and flour mills, which constituted the chief pre-war industry, are completely destroyed."

Poltava (Population in 1939: 130,305).

In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission reported Poltava about 80 per cent. destroyed. "About 100,000 of the inhabitants have returned and are living under conditions only slightly better than Kremenchug. On the main street only one building is intact. The Mayor estimated that reconstruction would take at least fifteen years. The locomotive repair shop and a stocking factory are the only industries operating two years after liberation."

Other Cities

In Zaporozhie (population in 1939: 289,188) 75 per cent. of the homes and virtually all industry were destroyed[1]. Stalino, the industrial and mining centre of the Donets Basin, has been described as a shadow of its former self. Its pre-war population was 510,000. During the war about 100,000 of the people were driven into slavery by the Germans. Another 80,000 men, women, and children were thrust into one of the mines to die. Seventy-five per cent. of all the buildings in the city were destroyed; and of these only 30 per cent. were in a condition to be restored. All the mines in the area were flooded; and from one pit alone over 3,300,000 tons of water had been pumped by August 1946[2].

The Ukraine's Application for UNRRA Assistance

727 In the summer of 1945 the government of the U.S.S.R. transmitted
648 to the Director General of UNRRA a request for assistance in rehabilitating
457 those areas of the Soviet Union which had suffered most heavily because of the war and the German occupation. In August 1945 at the Third Session of the UNRRA Council, the Soviet delegate strongly requested that 700 million U.S. dollars be allocated for relief work in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Republics. At the same Council Session the applications of Byelorussia and the Ukraine for membership in UNRRA were unanimously accepted, and the two republics were requested to send delegates to the Third Council meetings.

In December 1945 agreements were signed between UNRRA and the governments of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics providing for

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[1] UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

[2] Soviet News, London, August 22, 1946.

727 relief and rehabilitation supplies to be delivered until such time as
457 the two republics would be able themselves to pay with suitable means
648 of foreign exchange for their own imports[1].

727 The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement provided for a programme of supplies
439 amounting to 188 million U.S. dollars (approximately five dollars per head
648 of population), to be used for food, clothing, medical, agricultural, and industrial supplies. The agreement stipulated that UNRRA would attempt to deliver the bulk of these supplies to the Ukraine before June 30, 1946; however, because of procurement and transport difficulties, this early completion of the programme proved impossible. On May 30, 1946, therefore, the UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was extended to the end of 1946.

The schedule of supplies to be shipped has changed somewhat since the original programme was decided. As it now exists, about 53 per cent. (by value) of the total supplies are foodstuffs; 27 per cent. industrial supplies, and nearly 9 per cent. clothing. Supplies for the rehabilitation of agriculture will amount to 17,088,000 dollars, the greater part of which has been allocated for seeds. The following table shows by value the UNRRA programme of supplies for the Ukraine, as at March 21, 1947. A more detailed summary will follow in later sections of this report.

TABLE - III

UNRRA Programme of Supplies to the Ukrainian S.S.R.
(thousand U.S. dollars)

Food, feed, soap	100,189
Clothing, textiles, footwear	16,856
Medical and sanitation supplies	2,326
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591
Total	188,050

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

In March 1946 a small UNRRA Mission arrived in the Ukraine and established headquarters at Kiev. In subsequent months, some of the mission members have made many visits to various parts of the republic in order to observe the distribution of UNRRA supplies. They report that gigantic efforts are being made to restore the economy, but emphasize the discouraging fact that UNRRA assistance with machinery and other rehabilitation supplies is small in comparison with the tremendous destruction everywhere. The main UNRRA contribution has

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[1] UNRRA aid to Byelorussia will be dealt with in a future paper.

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439 been food supplies, which in many Ukrainian towns constituted the only
648 food to be seen in shops in 1946. For fats and oils particularly the Ukrainian population has been entirely dependent on UNRRA aid.

The U.S.S.R.'s Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

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648 UNRRA assistance to the Ukraine has been of necessity limited in scope and short-term in nature. Long after relief shipments are ended - and they are now all but complete - the Ukraine will still be working to rebuild its factories, cities, and farms. The main task of rehabilitation is therefore a long-term one, and depends upon long-range measures.

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185 On March 18, 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This plan is the fourth of a series of Five-Year Plans[1] designed to increase the productivity of Soviet farming and industry, and in general to raise the standard of living of the whole population. As stated by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the principal aims of the Five-Year Plan in 1946-50 are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of the country, to recover the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and then considerably to surpass that level.

[652] The new Five-Year Plan provides that nearly one-third of the capital investments for the entire Soviet Union in 1946-50 (49,500 million roubles out of a total of 250,300)[2] are to be spent on the restoration of the Ukraine. Of this 49,500 million, 5,469 million will be used for works under the Ukrainian Republic's jurisdiction.

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362 In the next five years all the destroyed cities of the Ukraine - particularly Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Stalino, and Zaporozhie - are to be rebuilt and their municipal services restored. Housing is to be replaced as speedily as possible; in 1946-50, 175,120,000 square feet of state-owned housing are to be built, of which 12.65 million square feet are to be made available by local Soviets. The amount of privately owned housing to be built before 1950 is fixed at 36.3 million square feet.

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185 Also under the Five-Year Plan Ukrainian agriculture is to be rehabilitated; the crop area for 1950 is planned at 30.5 million hectares. By 1950 the Ukraine is scheduled to be producing about 20 per cent. of the grain harvested in the U.S.S.R. (approximately the same tonnage as in pre-war years); 60 per cent. of the sugar beet (about 6 per cent. more than pre-war); and the potato harvest is fixed for 23 million tons, 1½ millions more than in 1940.

000 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport

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[1] First Five-Year Plan, 1929-32; second, 1933-37; third, 1938-42.

[2] Estimated at 1945 prices.

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Nevertheless, the 1945 harvest - assisted by lend-lease supplies which were still then available, and (beginning in December 1945) by UNRRA relief deliveries - was furnishing the population a fair amount of cereals and bread. There was, however, very little meat from domestic sources, and only a small amount of fats and oils, as the following table shows.

TABLE XII

Ukraine: Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils, 1945.

(thousand metric tons)

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[388]

		Oilseeds
Production		
Total production of oilseeds		496.4
Deduction for seed		53.6
Available for processing		442.8
Utilization		
Total production of oil		105.8
Deduction for industrial use (soap manufacture, etc.)		26.7
Available for human consumption		
by urban population	29.0	
by rural population	50.0	
Total		79.1
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
urban population		2.41
rural population		1.86
Average		1.98

433 As the table shows, the Ukrainian people received in 1945 only 4
262 to 5 kilograms of fats - 8 to 18 kilograms less than their pre-war
388 annual consumption rate.

Disaster in 1946

433 Early in 1946 other UNRRA supplies in addition to food began to
241 arrive - seeds, small quantities of fertilizers, and a few farm tools.
648 Throughout the Ukraine great efforts were being made for a successful spring sowing. However, there were still shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, and machinery. None of the 1,600 tractors promised by UNRRA had arrived. Much of the work was still being done by hand, especially where no draught animals were available.

[311] Even despite these drawbacks, it is estimated that about 80 per cent. of the pre-war area was sown; but no figures are available on the acreage planted to individual crops. In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission, describing the difficulties in getting detailed agricultural statistics, stated:

> "....During a recent inspection trip we were informed by the agricultural authorities of the Poltava oblast,[1] one of the best agricultural regions in the Ukraine, that they did not even try to set production goals for their collective farms this year (1946); they simply told each farm to plant as much as possible of whatever crops it could raise with the seed, equipment, draught animals, and manpower available. (For example) We believe that nobody really knows with any degree of accuracy what acreage was planted to oil seeds in the Ukraine this year, what yield may be expected, or how much of the resulting oil will be available for non-farm use."

433 The Ukrainian people set high hopes on the 1946 harvest. However,
241 in the very summer when a good crop would have made all the difference,
649 the greatest drought since 1891 destroyed their prospects. It affected a vast area from Moldavia to the Urals, south to the Kuban and north to Moscow. The earth was parched; and the crops, burnt by the hot summer sun, had little to draw upon because rain and snowfall in the winter of 1945-46 had been poor. Hopes withered with the wheat. The potato crop too was affected: a hot wind out of Asia dried the plants, and dwarfed the tubers.

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[1] Oblast: a district similar, for administrative purposes, to a county.

IV UNRRA ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINE

Distribution of UNRRA Supplies

648 731 UNRRA supplies for the Ukraine are handed over to the government at the port of entry (usually Odessa on the Black Sea); and the government is then responsible for arranging distribution.

648 731 647 Like most other countries receiving UNRRA help, the Ukrainian Government has established a special organization to supervise the reception, warehousing, and distribution of all UNRRA goods received. This organization - which has on its staff specialists in food, industrial equipment, agricultural rehabilitation, food processing machinery, medical supplies, transport, accounting and distribution - is called the Department of UNRRA Supplies, and is directly responsible to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

The Department (headed by Mr. V.V. Khomyak) works in close liaison with the various ministries of the Ukrainian Government, and with the UNRRA Mission. On the basis of decisions made by the particular ministries concerned, it draws up plans for the distribution of UNRRA supplies and keeps a central record of their sales and of the proceeds expended by the government for further relief projects.

584 648 731 Most UNRRA shipments for both the Ukraine and Byelorussia have arrived through the port of Odessa; and since early 1946 an UNRRA officer has been stationed there to handle problems connected with delivery. Before an UNRRA shipment comes in, the authorities at Odessa are notified of the ship's name, its expected time of arrival, and the nature of its cargo. As soon as possible after the ship lands, discharging of cargo begins. Stevedoring labour is supplied by the port commander's service organization, "Inflot", which also furnishes checkers to work in the ship's hold and on the docks, counting the supplies and reporting any damaged goods. As the cargo is unloaded, perishable items, such as clothing and cheese, are placed in warehouses on the docks, and seeds in a warehouse in the suburbs of Odessa. Packaged goods, such as canned meat, army rations, and juices, are piled on the dock at shipside and finally into freight cars.

648 731 Directives for the distribution of the supplies (based upon decisions of the recipient ministries concerned) are issued by the Department of UNRRA Supplies to the Ministry of Foreign Trade representative in Odessa, whose office then instructs the railroad and barge authorities, providing such information as the name and location of the organization or governmental authority receiving the supplies, and a description of the goods to be delivered.

[658] UNRRA relief supplies are either sold to individual ration-card or permit holders, or distributed to collectives, co-operatives, and other

648 731 [657] enterprises; and in accordance with the provisions of the UNRRA agreement, the Ukrainian Government uses the proceeds for further relief and rehabilitation work within the country. Food and soap supplies for example are sold through regular trade channels to ration-card holders, or are delivered to organizations which use them for factory or community feeding. Clothing also is sold in stores against ration cards, or in the case of workers having a high rate of clothing and shoe consumption, against special orders. Used clothing is distributed free of charge to invalids of the war, families of war dead, pensioners, or other recipients of social welfare. Medical supplies and equipment are transferred free of charge to the Ministry of Health. The distribution of agricultural and industrial equipment varies depending upon the nature of the supplies. Consumable items, such as seeds, jute, bagging, rope and industrial raw materials, are sold to collectives, state farms, co-operatives, or industrial enterprises. Capital equipment such as tractors, food processing machinery, or power generators is delivered free of charge to the recipient ministries or their subsidiary distribution organizations. Tractors in particular are delivered in this way to state-owned Machine Tractor Stations.

Proceeds of Sale of UNRRA Supplies

648 731 652 Up to March 1, 1947, the sale of UNRRA supplies in the Ukraine had provided the government with 3,166,482,000 roubles[1] for additional relief and rehabilitation work in the Republic. Roughly 85 per cent. of this total resulted from sales of UNRRA food; 6 per cent. from the sale of clothing; and 9 per cent. from the sale of miscellaneous raw materials and agricultural supplies.

Of the cumulative proceeds up to March 1, about 21 million roubles had been used to pay the expenses of distribution, and 823,511 roubles had been spent to provide goods and services to the UNRRA Mission. Of the balance then remaining available (3,144,655,500), nearly half had been used for rehabilitation work at the Republican (state) level of government; 1,324,239,000 roubles had been transferred to regional executive committees (the next level of government) for expenditure on local projects; and about 391 million roubles in cash was still available for future use.

State Relief and Rehabilitation Projects

652 657 At the state level rehabilitation work carried on from the beginning of UNRRA deliveries up to March 1, 1947, amounted to 1,429,060,000 roubles, and was divided among four main categories; rehabilitation of the national economy, 74 per cent. of the total state-level expenditures; health services, 14 per cent.; children's institutions and schools, 11 per cent.; and social welfare, 1 per cent.

Rehabilitation of the National Economy. These expenditures are administered by the various ministries having productive capital works

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[1] 21.36 roubles equals one pound sterling; 5.40 roubles equals one U.S dollar (March 1947).

652 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs,
657 and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production); repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry (under the Ministry of Home Construction).

Health Services. These expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Health, and include the feeding of patients, and repairs and equipment for hospitals and health service agencies.

[658] Children's Institutions (over four years) and Schools. These expenditures are handled by the Ministry of Education, and include the feeding of children; and capital works, repairs and equipment for schools and children's homes.

Social Welfare Services Directed towards the Betterment of General Well-Being. These expenditures are administed by the Ministry of Social Welfare and include such services as repairs and maintenance of social welfare agencies, and assistance to invalids.

Local Rehabilitation

● 648 As at March 1, 1947, about 41 per cent. of the gross proceeds of
727 UNRRA sales had been transferred to regional executive committees of
185 the government for use in the local and district economy. The local projects - which are undertaken after approval by the state authorities
731 and are subject to regular reporting and inspection - are similar in character to those carried out by the Republican Government Ministries. However, there is a considerable shift in emphasis. For example, at the regional level, nearly 57 per cent. of the total proceeds at their disposal was utilized for health services (hospitals, nurseries), 35 per cent. for children's institutions, 5 per cent. for repairs of public and industrial institutions, and 2 per cent. for the building of schools and repair of clubs.

Deliveries of UNRRA Supplies

648 In the original agreement between UNRRA and the Ukrainian Govern-
731 ment was a provision that the Administration would "strive within the limits of its resources" to procure and deliver the Ukraine's share of relief and rehabilitation supplies before July 1, 1946. In the early months of 1946, however, it became clear that procurement difficulties and transport hold-ups would prevent a great part of the supplies from being delivered in time. The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was therefore extended to the end of 1946.

From December 1945, (when UNRRA deliveries to the Ukraine began) up to June 30, 1946, (the time at which they were originally scheduled

648 to end) only 202,585 gross long tons of UNRRA supplies had arrived in
731 the Ukraine. These consisted mainly of foodstuffs (three-fourths of the entire tonnage); while slightly less than one-tenth was made up of clothing, textiles and footwear; and 67 tons were medical equipment. Despite the urgent need of agricultural and industrial supplies, only 15,336 and 13,249 tons respectively had reached the Ukraine by the end of June.

By the end of January 1947, UNRRA shipments to the Ukraine from all sources amounted to 407,125 gross long tons; and the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine reported that 372,796 tons of this had reached Soviet
[504] ports. Delays in shipments during December and January were greater than usual because the port of Odessa for the first time in many years was frozen over, and ships lay icebound for days.

The following table shows UNRRA shipments in comparison with the programme.

TABLE XXII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Programme (thousand U.S. dollars)	Shipments to January 31, 1946 (thousand U.S. dollars)	(gross long tons)
Food, feed, soap	100,189	94,587	287,519
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	16,856	16,801	15,095
Medical and sanitation	2,326	1,858	373
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088	14,403	29,070
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591	34,077	75,068
Totals	188,050	161,726	407,125

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Industrial Rehabilitation Supplies

731 As the table shows, 75,068 gross long tons of the total supplies
48 shipped by January 31 were industrial rehabilitation equipment. These supplies have, however, been extremely slow in arriving. Up to the
433 end of June 1946 only 13,249 gross long tons had reached the Ukraine, including United States army surplus equipment of about 20 electric power stations and generators, as well as some raw materials, chiefly rubber, tin, lead, copper and other metals, and welding electrodes. A small number of machines for use in automobile repair shops, and about 90 motor cars and trucks had also arrived; but the slow delivery of machinery to transport materials and process building equipment was a serious defect, since much of the rubble of war damage had been cleared away, and the lack of such supplies was a hindrance to

731 rebuilding. Between July 1, 1946, and January 31, 1947, however,
648 another 38,744 tons of industrial supplies arrived, bringing the
433 deliveries up to 51,993 gross long tons.

The following table shows the composition of all industrial supplies shipped to the Ukraine by the end of January 1947

TABLE XXIII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Industrial Equipment up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Transport and telecommunications	620	949
Public utilities	18,975	27,451
Building repair equipment	5,030	3,209
Machine repair equipment	1,041	527
Miscellaneous consumer goods	307	97
Materials, chemicals, engineering stores	7,930	42,684
	174	151
Totals	34,077	75,068

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Many of the metals which have been received are being used in canning factories or in the manufacture of household utensils and dishes. Pipe supplies (the first shipments of which arrived in December) are being used to replace destroyed water and gas mains. Canvas tarpaulin has been distributed for use in mines and on the farms of the Ukraine. Although these supplies have unquestionably filled some of the needs, the UNRRA Mission reports that the quantities are too small and the task of reconstruction too great for them to make much impact.

About one-third of the industrial rehabilitation programme for the Ukraine consists of so-called "protocol" supplies - that is certain items of industrial equipment which in a previous trade agreement the United Kingdom had contracted to furnish to the Soviet Union. After UNRRA assumed responsibility in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, negotiations commenced for the transfer of this equipment through UNRRA. About the middle of 1946 arrangements were concluded; and it was agreed that UNRRA would take over and deliver these "protocol" supplies as part of the industrial rehabilitation programme. Similarly, UNRRA became financially responsible for those "protocol" supplies which had already been delivered to the Soviet Union for use in Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

By March 1, 1947, about 16,720,000 dollars' worth of "protocol"

731 433 648 supplies had been shipped to the Ukraine; remaining "protocol" shipments to the Ukraine are expected to amount to 923 tons and 784,617 dollars.

Included in these supplies are power stations, pumps, portable cranes, presses, electric locomotives, and electrical and telephone equipment.

Agricultural Supplies

731 241 648 The greater part of the tonnage in agricultural supplies consisted of seeds; by January 31, 1947, 15,669 gross long tons had been shipped. Most of these seeds had arrived in the spring of 1946; however, some of the bags were inadequately labelled, and the contents not easily identifiable. Because of this difficulty the seeds had to be given costly and time-consuming laboratory tests, which delayed distribution. At the same time, 2,600 tons of seeds were reported by the Ukrainian Government to be either diseased or infested with weeds, and therefore unfit for sowing. Negotiations are still in process for the replacement of these defective seeds by suitable types.

[407] As at the end of 1946 the amount of farm machinery which had arrived was small. For example, the UNRRA programme calls for the delivery of 1,600 tractors to the Ukraine, but only 310 had been received by December 31, and these came too late for autumn ploughing. They are being distributed to state owned Machine Tractor Stations for use this spring.

UNRRA shipments have also included 6,692 tons of bagging, 2,090 tons of fishing equipment, and 244 tons of dairy equipment. These are shown in the following table, which summarizes agricultural rehabilitation shipments to the end of January.

TABLE XXIV

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Agricultural Supplies up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Bagging	1,672	6,692
Farm machinery	1,517	2,941
Fishing equipment	651	2,090
Food processing equipment	551	1,122
Repair material and hand tools		312
Seeds	9,861	15,669
Dairy and poultry equipment	151	244
Totals	14,403	29,070

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Medical Supplies

731 The UNRRA medical and sanitation programme for the Ukraine is
758 extremely small in relation to the needs; and the rate of deliveries
648 has been the poorest of any commodity group.

Up to the end of January 1947 the Administration had shipped to the Ukraine 373 gross long tons of medical and sanitation equipment valued at 1,858,000 dollars, leaving a balance still to be shipped of just over 468,000 dollars.

In a country where the destruction has been so great and where food supplies are so low, a medical programme of 2,326,000 dollars cannot make much impression; however, such equipment as has been received is being used to the best possible advantage.

743 Most of the hospitals and invalids' homes in the Ukraine are operating under appalling difficulties; and the urgency of the need for equipment and medical supplies is everywhere evident. The UNRRA Mission early in 1946 described several hospitals which they had visited in various parts of the Ukraine. Here is their observation of the one at Kremenchug:

"Kremenchug formerly had a good 450-bed general hospital, which was blown up by a thoroughly efficient demolition battalion when the Germans retreated. All equipment, including an 8,000-volume medical library and a well-equipped X-ray laboratory, was demolished. The only buildings which escaped destruction were seven small sheds and storage houses on the outskirts of the hospital grounds.

"The hospital staff recently installed 250 beds in these ramshackle buildings. In a number of wards the windows were bricked up because no glass is available, and the only light came from an unshaded 40-watt electric bulb in the corridor. Paint was flaking off the floor and the walls of the surgery; most of the roofs leaked, there were no indoor toilets; fuel was available to heat only the operating and delivery rooms and the nursery. (Four babies, on an average, are delivered each
743 day). Many of the patients had no gowns and no bed clothes, except
758 what they were able to bring with them. No soap whatever has been available to the hospital for some time; laundry was simply being boiled with a little soda, and the floors were scrubbed with a lye solution. The only surgical equipment we saw was a few dozen scalpels and haemostats in one small cabinet in the corner of the operating room, and two sterilizers.

"The doctor in charge told us that his patients received an average diet of 1,000 to 1,200 calories a day, consisting mostly of bread, potatoes, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of fat. (The low calorie intake is largely due to the inability of the patients to digest the coarse whole-grain rye or wheat bread, which is available in reasonable quantities). Theoretically the hospital is entitled to 2,500 grams

743 of meat daily for each thirty patients; but, since there is rarely
758 any meat to be had, it received 400 grams of dried milk as a substitute,
or approximately 13 grams per patient each day.

"The hospital was so badly overcrowded that beds had been set up in the corridors and even in the yard. Some of these beds had been salvaged from the ruins of the old hospital, and consequently were badly twisted and charred."

The same general conditions prevailed in most of the hospitals visited. The fact that so much improvement has since been made with so little help promises the best use of future deliveries of UNRRA medical supplies. The programme includes in addition to dressings, drugs and chemicals, X-ray equipment and supplies, surgical instruments, dental equipment, and a penicillin plant.

Clothing

241 Since most of the Ukraine's clothing factories were heavily
[294] damaged or destroyed in the war, there is a widespread shortage of all
articles of wearing apparel. The limited UNRRA programme has fallen
448 considerably short of satisfying all the requirements; however, such
731 supplies as have been sent - particularly textiles and shoes - have
been economically used to help the most critical cases.

By the end of January 1947 UNRRA had sent the Ukraine 15,095 gross long tons of clothing valued at 16,801 dollars, leaving an unshipped balance of 55,000 dollars. The following table gives the composition of the shipments.

TABLE XXV

UNRRA Shipments of Clothing to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Finished clothing	779	384
Blankets and comforters	902	522
Cotton textiles	573	321
Woollen textiles	3,487	1,359
Raw wool	2,240	3,729
Footwear	5,697	3,997
Upper leather	575	259
Sole leather	1,274	1,626
Hides	188	381
Miscellaneous textiles	183	149
Miscellaneous footwear	735	2,368
Unclassified	168	n.a.
Totals	16,801	15,095

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

291 In addition to these items, UNRRA has delivered several thousand
73, tons of used clothing and footwear contributed through voluntary
648 relief organizations in other countries. Most of the contributed supplies are distributed to war invalids or to orphans of the war.

The thousands of pairs of shoes delivered by UNRRA, as well as shoes made in the Ukraine from UNRRA leather, are sold according to a rationing system, with miners and heavy industry workers receiving highest priority. Textiles (also rationed) are sold as piece goods, or are made into garments in Ukrainian workshops for sale to permit holders. UNRRA blankets and comforters are distributed chiefly to hospitals and childrens' homes; and hides and other materials furnished by UNRRA are used in the construction of orthopaedic footwear or artificial limbs for wounded veterans.

Food Supplies

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241 When the UNRRA Mission first arrived in the Ukraine, no data
were available on the republic's exact food situation. The 1945
433 crops sown in a reduced area, under great difficulties of seed,
262 fertilizer, and implement shortages, had yielded only a fraction of pre-war harvests. It was expected, however, that Ukrainian farms would produce enough grain to supply the population with bread and cereals until the 1946-47 harvest. UNRRA food supplies were therefore calculated to provide chiefly meats, fats (or equivalents in the form of army rations), and dairy products.

731 Altogether, UNRRA planned to use 100 million dollars of the
262 Ukrainian budget for food. By the end of January 1947, all but
648 5½ million dollars of this had been shipped, as is shown in the following table.

TABLE XXVI

UNRRA Food Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Grain and grain products	548	3,836
Meat and meat products	30,682	54,245
Fish	4,166	23,640
Dairy products	13,378	33,134
Fats, oils, soap	12,725	41,885
Pulses	615	4,658
Beverages	1,490	3,437
Soup- dehydrated	2,835	9,392
Quartermaster food	27,134	109,055
Other food	206	548
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture surpluses	808	3,689
Totals	94,587	287,519

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 649 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

S.U. 562 635 UK. 698 175

Soviet Russia has often followed in the footsteps of Czarist Russia, but as far as the appraisal of the Ukraine is concerned there is no continuity between old and new Russia. Czarist Russia simply denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation and denounced all Ukrainian national feeling as 'South Russian separatism'. Soviet policy, on the other hand, has encouraged Ukrainian nationalism in as far as it was able to serve Russia's territorial expansion. The most spectacular territorial advance which the Soviet Union has made since 1939 was that realized under the slogan 'unification of all Ukrainian lands in one national State'. In the course of this unification the Soviet Union not only re-annexed territories which Russia had lost in the Civil War but also occupied territories which had ceased to be 'Russian' ever since the Middle Ages, such as Eastern Galicia with the city of Lvov.

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There cannot be the slightest doubt about the existence of a Ukrainian nation which some Russian nationalists tried to deny in the past, but it would be a mistake to consider the Ukrainians, despite their numbers, as a nation equal in character to the French, Italians, Spaniards, etc., as the extremists among the Ukrainian nationalists would like to represent it. The Ukrainians cannot claim to be historically and culturally a nation so complete that they could afford to cut themselves loose from their Russian neighbours and exist without them.

All foreign invaders fighting Russia had illusions in this respect; they all believed in a separation of Ukraine and Muscovy and conducted their political warfare accordingly. The Swedish King, Charles XII, allied himself with the Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Mazeppa; Napoleon came to Russia with the project of a Ukrainian State, 'Napoleonide', cutting Russia off from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. The Third Reich of Adolf Hitler also tried to play up the Ukrainian issue against Great Russia.

'LITTLE RUSSIA' AND 'NEW RUSSIA'

UK. 101 186 538

There is every justification in the demand for a genuinely autonomous Ukraine but there is no logic and no life in an anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist ideology. Neither Russian and Ukrainian history, nor the area of Russian and Ukrainian settlement, nor even Russian and Ukrainian literature can be separated from each other. Gogol, for instance, who wrote in Russian only, can be claimed by the Ukrainians not only because he was born in 'Little Russia', as the Ukraine used to be called in Czarist times, but also because some of his great works are devoted to his homeland, including the most Ukrainian literary work *Taras Bulba*. The Ukrainians have failed to produce any Ukrainian-writing poet or writer who even approximates to the importance of a Gogol.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

S.U. 563 648 208

There was hardly any other territory on the Russian border where the Soviet régime stood such an excellent chance of exploiting social grievances and the discontent of oppressed minorities as in Eastern Poland. Yet the Ukrainians and Byelorussians of Eastern Poland, who according to all logical calculations were bound to become a natural prey to Soviet propaganda, turned away from Russia in protest against compulsory collectivization, political purges and anti-religious propaganda.

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The sympathies which the Soviet Union enjoyed among the poor peasantry of the Western Ukraine in the first years after the October Revolution had almost completely died out by the end of the twenties. Moscow could not even rely on its own 'Communist Party of the Western Ukraine' which frequently took its lead from the anti-Russian 'national deviationists' in the Soviet Ukraine. When the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine split at the beginning of 1928 into 'loyal communists' and Ukrainian nationalists, the latter, led by Vasilkov, had the majority in the Central Committee. The Vasilkov group, said the Comintern organ, *Communist International*, 'was consciously counter-revolutionary and carried out wrecking work and provocations'.[9]

The Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had hardly been reorganized when several party groups again fell victims to Ukrainian anti-Soviet nationalism. In 1935 the official Comintern organ complained about the absence of 'a national liberation struggle on a large scale in both the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia', meaning, of course, a pro-Soviet national liberation struggle.[10]

In 1938 the Comintern journal was forced to admit that the nationalist anti-Soviet organization U.N.D.O., which stood for Ukrainian autonomy inside Poland, was backed by broad masses of the people of the Western Ukraine and that the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had not succeeded 'in penetrating the organizations of Ukrainian nationalists'. The Western Ukrainian Communist Party finally found itself compelled to exchange its demand for self-determination for a demand for autonomy which had been originally branded as a 'bourgeois counter-revolutionary slogan'.[11]

The full extent of the political defeat suffered by Soviet Russia and Comintern propaganda in the Western Ukraine can be realized if one takes into account the active persecution which the Polish authorities conducted against Ukrainian nationalism, the punitive expeditions which they carried out against recalcitrant Ukrainian villages and the almost total disregard of the Polish Government for the cultural needs of the Polish Ukrainians. All these hardships which the Ukrainians of Poland suffered in the inter-war period were insufficient to promote any major co-operation between them and the Soviet régime.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

186 661 538 Maxim Rilsky*, were dismissed in November 1946. Rilsky, one of the most outstanding poets of the Soviet Ukraine, was charged with being a 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. He had not only 'sinned' in his works but he had also delivered a particularly objectionable lecture, 'Kiev in the history of the Ukraine', in which he 'idealized the old patriarchal order and depicted in rosy idyllic colours the conditions under the rule of landowners and bourgeois'. Together with Rilsky a whole group of Ukrainian writers was accused of nationalism, 'Khvylovy-ism' and reactionary tendencies, including I. Senchenko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch.[21]

Maxim Rilsky was replaced as president of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers by A. Y. Korneichuk, author of a large number of political plays, who had always accurately interpreted the party line and had earned nothing but praise from the supreme Soviet leadership. It was Korneichuk's task to lead Ukrainian literature on the road of strict Soviet Patriotism and 'Socialist Realism'. Indeed, Ukrainian writers, publishing houses and literary journals became more careful and it appeared during a certain period as if Korneichuk had really succeeded in his assignment. The 'Festival of Ukrainian Art and Literature' held in Moscow in June 1951 showed, however, that this was a deception. The festival gave the members of the Bolshevik Politbureau an opportunity of getting a closer look at Ukrainian cultural life. They found that Ukrainian authors and artists had still not overcome their ideological mistakes. Even Korneichuk himself who was expected to give a good example to his fellow-writers had committed a serious offence. He had written a libretto for the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnitsky', which, from the official point of view, was not sufficiently anti-Polish and not eloquent [626] enough in its pro-Russian bias. Through its mouthpiece, *Pravda*, the Politbureau not only denounced Korneichuk and other writers for ideological distortions but also reprimanded the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party for having neglected the political education of the Ukrainian intellectual élite. The Ukrainian Central Committee, mindful of what had happened to the Ukrainian Communist leaders in the thirties, immediately pledged itself to remedy the situation.[23]

THE UKRAINE AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET 'WORLD POLITICS'

648 645 After having fulfilled its original mission of bringing all Ukrainian lands into the fold of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was given a new task.

* Rilsky, like most great poets of the Soviet Ukraine, has a 'nationalistic past'. In 1934 he and another poet laureate of the Ukraine, Pavel Tychina, were rebuked for their 'hesitation' in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to them. Yet another contemporary Ukrainian poet, Mikola Bazhan, who is not only like Tychina a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet but also a Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Government, used to be likewise blamed for the 'nationalistic soil in which his creations have been rooted'.[22]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

UKRAINE RD1

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She was to serve Soviet diplomacy in the wider international arena. 648
The turning point in the mission of the Ukraine came early in 1944 645
with the setting up of a Ukrainian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Ukrainian Foreign Office came into being under the decree of S.U.
February 1st, 1944, providing for the establishment of People's Commis- 635
sariats (later Ministries) for Foreign Affairs in all the sixteen Soviet 648
Republics. It was clear, however, that this decree, despite its general character, had the primary object of giving the Ukraine a new formal status in international affairs. To a much lesser extent this was true regarding Byelorussia, whilst little practical use was made of the foreign offices of the other Soviet Republics.

For a short while the real meaning of the creation of a Ukrainian and of a Byelorussian Foreign Office was not quite clear. At first it looked as if the central Government intended to make a real concession to the two Soviet Republics which had so heavily suffered by the war. The impression was confirmed by a statement of the veteran Ukrainian Bolshevik, Dimitry Manuilsky. Speaking in his capacity as Ukrainian Foreign Minister he announced in 1945 that the Ukrainian S.S.R. was 'ready at any time to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with any country'. Addressing over 400 foreign journalists, at a press conference in San Francisco, Manuilsky added that the Ukrainian Government would 'consider with gratitude any proposals by other States with regard to foreign relations'.[24] Soon after this statement had been made the Kremlin apparently regretted its generous gesture and the Ukraine was not allowed to establish consular and diplomatic missions abroad. A British offer to exchange consular representatives between the United Kingdom and the Ukrainian S.S.R. was turned down.

While the Ukraine is not supposed to have consuls and diplomats she UK.
has been encouraged to send delegates to international conferences [648]
and to the United Nations. These delegates do not defend the interests of even a communist Ukrainian State, but only those of the centralized Soviet Empire. The Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations has frequently been ordered to effect this or that tactical move whenever the delegation of the U.S.S.R. desired to remain in the background.

NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE UKRAINE

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During the inter-war period the Ukrainian S.S.R. was still a multi- 563
national State despite the clear preponderance of the Ukrainians. S.U.
National minorities represented about 20 per cent of the total popula- 563
tion of the Ukraine in its pre-war frontiers. With the two most important minorities, Russians and Jews, we are dealing in another context. It suffices to underline with regard to both these minority groups that they acted as a brake on separatist Ukrainian tendencies, thus fulfilling a